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JURISDICTION OF APPKLLAJIE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) pursuant to an Order of the Utah Supreme Court entered
November 1,2010.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the District Court Err in its Interpretation of the Word "Employment" in
Amendment No. 2 to the Operating Agreement by Concluding as a Matter of
Law that it Cannot Include Leased Employment?
Standard of Review:
The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents a question of law

which this Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2001 I IT 50,
^[16, 84 P.3d 1134.

Agreements relating to the ownership ol business entities are

reviewed under the rules for interpretation of contracts.
Herriman, et al,

Dansie, et al v. City of

2006 UT 23, ffi[5-6, 134 P.3d 1139 (interpreting articles of

incorporation); Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 200 I II i 28, ^|15, 94 1* Ul 1 <M (applying
rules of contract interpretation to shareholder agreement).
Preservation Below:
This issue was preserved below in Appellant's Motions and Memoranda
filed in the District Court. (R. 2510-2581, 2682-2689, 6567-6641, 6765-6772.)

1

IL

Did the Trial Court Err by Failing to Consider Extrinsic Evidence in
Determining Whether Amendment No, 2 of the Operating Agreement is
Ambiguous?
Standard of Review:
Determining whether a contract is ambiguous presents a threshold question

of law which this Court reviews for correctness. Interwest Construction v. Palmer, et al,
923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 1996).
Preservation Below:
This issue was preserved below in Appellant's Motions and Memoranda
filed in the District Court. (R. 2510-2581, 2682-2689, 6567-6641, 6765-6772.)
III.

Did the District Court Err in Entering the Order and Judgment Despite
Genuine Issues of Fact in the Record?
Standard of Review:
This Court reviews a District Court's summary judgment ruling for

correctness. The Court considers only whether the trial court correctly applied the law
and correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed. Kessler v.
Mortenson, et al, 2000 UT 95, ^|5, 16 P.3d 1225.
Preservation Below:
This issue was preserved below in Appellant's Memoranda filed in the
District Court. (R. 6517-6559.)

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, rules, or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Appellant ME&LS filed suit below against Bennett and other defendants

based upon conduct both before and after his resignation. Bennett resigned in August
2005 and formed his own civil engineering firm in competition with ME&LS, and has
not worked for ME&LS ever since then. Upon Bennett's resignation, ME&LS asserted
its right to repurchase his membership interest based upon the ME&LS operating
agreement. Bennett would not agree to the repurchase, however, and argued he was still
a member of ME&LS even though he had left to start his own firm. The primary issue in
this appeal is whether Bennett's resignation of employment triggered his withdrawal as a
member of ME&LS and the right of ME&LS to repurchase his interest.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Both ME&LS and Bennett filed Motions for Summary Judgment on the

issue of whether Bennett's resignation of employment triggered his withdrawal as a
member of ME&LS. The Motions were briefed and argued before the Third District
Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Ann Boyden. Judge Boyden ruled that
Bennett did not withdraw as a member by resigning, and entered an Order on
December 21,2006. (Addendum 4.)
3

Bennett filed a Motion seeking the entry of afinaljudgment in his favor. In
the Motion, Bennett argued he did not withdraw as a member of ME&LS upon his
resignation of employment, and he also sought a share of company profits for time
periods after he resigned. Judge Brian granted the Motion and entered an Order and
Judgment on April 3, 2008 (the "Judgment"). (Addendum 5.)
ME&LS filed its first appeal in April 2008 and this Court issued a
Memorandum Decision on May 21, 2009 ruling that the Judgment was not final for
purposes of appeal. (Addendum 6.)
Upon remand the District Court again ruled that the Judgment is final for
purposes of appeal, issuing a Minute Entry on September 21, 2010. (Addendum 7.)
ME&LS filed a Motion to Alter or Amend seeking to ensure that the District Court's
ruling fully complied with this Court's Memorandum Decision in the prior appeal. The
District Court then entered an Amended Order Certifying Order and Judgment as Final
on October 19, 2010, making the findings and ruling required by the Memorandum
Decision. (Addendum 8.)
C.

Disposition Below.
The District Court entered the Judgment on April 3, 2008. (Addendum 5.)

The Judgment was based upon the prior Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008
which found that Bennett was still a member of ME&LS. The Judgment awarded
$142,174.93 in favor of Bennett and against ME&LS, "which Bennett claims represents
his share of cash distributions" from ME&LS. (Addendum 5.) Through the course of
proceedings described above the District Court entered an Amended Order Certifying
4

Order and Judgment as Final on October 19, 2010 certifying the Judgment as final under
Rule 54(b) and determining that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal from the
Order and Judgment.

ME&LS filed its Notice of Appeal on October 20, 2010.

(Addendum 9.)

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A,

The McNeil Companies.
1.

In 1983, Scott F. McNeil ("McNeil") formed McNeil Engineering,

Inc. ("MEI") as a civil and structural engineering firm in Salt Lake City. (R. 2840.)
McNeil was the sole owner of MEL
2.

In 1996, three limited liability companies were created, including

ME&LS, to divide and take over the operations of MEI. (R. 6625-6626.)
3.

The business was "divided up into three departments or

subcompanies ... under the [MEI] umbrella." Afterward, MEI became an administrative
entity and did not perform engineering services.

The staff of MEI performed

administrative functions for the limited liability companies. (R. 6625, 6627-6628.)
4.

From the beginning ME&LS and the other companies leased all of

their employees from MEI. Bennett was an employee of MEI who was leased to and
worked only for ME&LS. (R. 6583-6585, 6628.) MEI then had no other role besides
leasing employees and performing administrative functions. (R. 6628.)

5

B,

ME&LS Operating Agreement
5.

In December 1996, each Member of the newly-formed ME&LS,

including Bennett, signed the Operating Agreement for ME&LS (the "Operating
Agreement"). (Addendum 1.) (R. 6583, 6615.)
6.

On August 1, 2000, the Members formally amended the Operating

Agreement by signing Amendment No. 1. The terms of that Amendment are not at issue
in this appeal.
7.

On November 1, 2001, the Members again revised the Operating

Agreement by signing Amendment No. 2 (the "Second Amendment"). The Second
Amendment was signed by all of the Members including Bennett. (Addendum 2 at 4-5.)
8.

The Second Amendment, added new provisions governing the

dissociation of Members of ME&LS. (Id.)
9.

The Operating Agreement originally provided for the withdrawal of

a Member only "with the consent of a Majority of the remaining Members ...."
(Addendum 1, § 12.1(a).) It did not define what would constitute the "withdrawal" of a
Member of ME&LS. (Addendum 1, Article XII.)
10.

With the Second Amendment, the consent of other Members was no

longer required for withdrawal. Section 12.1 now provided that a person "shall cease to
be a Member upon the happening of any of the following events: (a) the withdrawal
of a Member ...." (Addendum 2 at 2 (emphasis added).)
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11.

The Second Amendment also added Section 12.3 describing what

constitutes the withdrawal of a Member and giving ME&LS an option to purchase a
withdrawing Member's interest. (Addendum 2 at 3.)
12.

Section 12.3 states: "In the event a Member withdraws from the

Company prior to the expiration of the Term, the Company ... shall have an option to
purchase the withdrawing Member's Membership Interest." (Id.)
13.

Section 12.3(a) then provides: "For purposes of this Section, a

Member shall be deemed to withdraw when the Member voluntarily resigns or
terminates the Member's employment with the Company for reasons other than
bankruptcy, death, disability or incompetency." (Id. (emphasis added).)
14.

Section 12.3(b) also states: "The option to purchase a withdrawing

Member's Membership Interest shall be exercised by giving written notice thereof to the
withdrawing Member." (Id.)
15.

"The purchase price shall be an amount equal to the book value of

the Member's Membership Interest in the Company (as defined in Section 11.3.4
above), to be paid over a period not to exceed five years." (Id. § 12.3(c).)
16.

The Operating Agreement defines the term "Company" as ME&LS.

(Addendum 1 at 2.)
B.

Bennett's Employment and Resignation.
17.

From the beginning in 1996, ME&LS and the other LLCs leased all

of their employees from MEI. (R. 6627-6628.)
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18.

Bennett was employed by MEI but was leased to and worked only

for ME&LS. (R. 6583-6585.) Bennett testified that after the limited liability companies
were formed 'everything ... was supposed to have gone through the LCs, as far as the
jobs, and ... [MEI] was more of an administration ...." (R. 2569, 6585.)
19.

He testified the purpose of MEI was to keep "the three companies

together, even though some of us had no interest in the other companies" and also "to
just continue to keep the employees so that they had their same - the number of years
that they had worked for a company instead of having to start over with a new company
...." (R. 6584-6585.)
20.

Bennett concedes that ME&LS provided him with a personal vehicle

and other benefits, and that he was responsible for directing the work of other leased
employees of ME&LS. (R. 6586, 6571, 6699.)
21.

The term "employment" as used in Section 12.3(a) is not defined in

the Operating Agreement or the Second Amendment. (See Addenda 1 and 2.)
22.

By the time Bennett signed the Second Amendment to the Operating

Agreement on November 1, 2001, he had been a leased employee of ME&LS for about
5 years. (See Addenda 1 and 2.)
23.

Each other Member of ME&LS who signed the Second Amendment

also was a leased employee of ME&LS. (R. 6627-6628.)
24.

On August 17, 2005, Bennett submitted a letter of resignation to

McNeil (the "Resignation Letter"). (See Addendum 3.) The Resignation Letter states
Bennett resigned voluntarily to "pursue other options." (Addendum 3 at 1.)
8

25.

Bennett has not worked for ME&LS or any of the McNeil

companies since his resignation in August 2005. (R. 6588.)
26.

The Resignation Letter indicates Bennett expected the repurchase of

his membership interest in ME&LS following his resignation. It states: "Due to the fact
that I have contributed so much in building up the Company over the years, I feel it fair
that I receive at least current book value for my 252 interests ... in a timely
manner." (Addendum 3 at 2 (emphasis added).)
C.

Bennett's Membership Interest.
27.

At the creation of ME&LS, Bennett received an ownership interest

and became a Managing Member. He began with a 25% interest for which he paid
$250, or $1 per share. (Addendum 1 at Ex. A; R. 6616.) His percentage was later
increased to 26.53%. (R. 6698.)
28.

Bennett had no ownership interest in MEI or any other McNeil

company besides ME&LS. (R. 2580.)
29.

Pursuant to Section 12.3 of the Second Amendment, ME&LS

exercised its option to repurchase Bennett's membership interest after he resigned.
(R. 2577-2578.)
30.

Bennett rejected the offer and asserted his resignation did not trigger

withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS. (R. 2580-2581.)
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D.

December 21, 2006 Order on Cross Motions.
31.

ME&LS filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asking the

District Court to rule that when Bennett resigned and terminated his leased employment
with ME&LS, he withdrew as a Member. (R. 2510-2581.)
32.

Bennett filed a Cross Motion arguing he resigned only from MEI,

not ME&LS, and therefore did not withdraw as a Member of ME&LS. (R. 2585-2644.)
33.

On December 21, 2006, the District Court entered an Order ruling

that Bennett did not withdraw from ME&LS and was still a member. The Order states
that the Members of ME&LS "intended the term 'employment' to refer only to
employment specifically with ME&LS, and that the parties did not intend the term to be
broad enough to include employees leased from other businesses." (Addendum 4.)
E.

The Judgment.
34.

On January 7, 2008, Bennett filed a Motion asking the Court to enter

judgment against ME&LS "as to the amounts of member distributions which were paid
in the years 2005 and 2006." (R. 6432-6433.)
35.

The Motion argued "there is no 'just reason for delay' in entering

judgment for the amounts owed to Bennett." (R. 6447.)
36.

ME&LS opposed the Motion by arguing among other things that

Bennett was not entitled to a share of payments to Members, even if he was still a
Member of ME&LS. (R. 6517-6527.)
37.

On April 3, 2008, the District Court entered the Judgment in favor of

Bennett and against ME&LS in the amount of $142,174.93. (Addendum 5.) The
10

Judgment was based upon the District Court's prior Order of December 21, 2006 and
also its Order of April 2, 2008.
i.
38.

Bennett is Not Entitled to Guaranteed Payments.
In early 2006, a majority of the Members agreed that ME&LS

profits should be paid to Members based upon "productivity" instead of ownership
interests. (R. 6520.)
39.

ME&LS asked its accountant, Mark J. Duffin, CPA ("Duffm"), how

to pay its Members "for services performed" and Duffin recommended the option of
guaranteed payments. Duffin testified that IRS regulations allow a limited liability
company to elect to compensate Members by way of "guaranteed payments" based upon
their service, production, or capital. (R. 6525, 6538-6542.) See 26 U.S.C. §707(c); 26
C.F.R. §1.707-1(c).
40.

ME&LS made that election in 2006 and all payments to Members

during 2006 were made as "guaranteed payments." (R. 6523.)
ii.
41.

ME&LS Has Offsetting Damages Claims.
At the hearing on November 17, 2006, when Judge Boy den ruled

Bennett was still a Member, the District Court declined to make an award of any other
"rights and benefits" as Bennett requested, both because an accounting was ordered and
"more importantly" because there remained a question of "whether there are any offsets,
and the other issues that may come up in that accounting." (R. 6893, T. 40-41)
42.

Therefore, the Order of December 21, 2006 does not include an

award of any rights or benefits of Bennett's membership. (Addendum 4.)
11

43.

ME&LS argued that damages from its pending claims "could more

than offset any amounts that may be due to Bennett." (R. 6526.)
44.

By Order entered January 29, 2008 the District Court found that

there were material issues of fact which required a trial on the Plaintiffs' claims of
interference with business relations, breach of the ME&LS Operating Agreement, and
trademark violations, among others. (R. 6560-6566.)
45.

Plaintiffs retained a damages expert and submitted the required

expert report and disclosures. Bennett did not depose the expert or designate one of his
own. ME&LS argued its damages claims at least offset any amounts Bennett claims to
be owed. (R. 6895, T. 42-43.)
46.

The District Court specifically found that "Defendants did not

contest Plaintiffs' evidence of damages in their Motion for Summary Judgment. All
issues related to Plaintiffs' evidence of damages are preserved for trial." (R. 6562.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court adopted an unreasonably narrow interpretation of the
word "employment" as found in the Second Amendment to the Operating Agreement.
By interpreting it to exclude leased employment, the District Court ignored the common,
daily usage of the word. "Employment" is broadly defined and liberally construed in
Utah law. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah et al, 771 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The District Court's rulings also
failed to acknowledge that ME&LS is where Bennett performed all of the work that
12

constituted his "employment." It is undisputed that Bennett was leased to and worked
only for ME&LS. Utah statutory and case law acknowledge the common practice of
leasing employees among Utah businesses, and the employment of leased employees is
determined by focusing on the company for whom their work is done.
The District Court also improperly failed to interpret the Operating
Agreement and the Second Amendment "in an attempt to harmonize and give effect to all
of the contract provisions." Nielsen v. O'Reilly, et al9 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992).
The unduly narrow interpretation on which the Judgment and the underlying Orders is
based renders most of the Second Amendment meaningless and leads to absurd results.
Under the District Court's interpretation, for example, the withdrawal provisions of the
Second Amendment would never have any application and no Member of ME&LS could
ever withdraw by resigning employment.
Bennett's resignation was clearly voluntary, and there is no question it
ended his leased employment and all of his work for ME&LS. Bennett maintains he only
resigned from MEI, however, and that somehow the resignation did not terminate his
employment with ME&LS.

His strained argument is based on the fundamentally

illogical premise that he had no "employment with ME&LS" where he did all of his
work, and had "employment" only with MEI where he did no work. Giving effect to all
provisions of the Second Amendment, and ignoring none, compels the holding that
Bennett withdrew as a Member of ME&LS when he resigned on August 17, 2005.
Considering extrinsic evidence, at least preliminarily, also supports
ME&LS' interpretation of the Second Amendment. Relevant extrinsic evidence includes
13

the facts that ME&LS always leased all of its employees from MEI, that Bennett and
each other Member who signed the Second Amendment were working as leased
employees of ME&LS when they signed it, and that Bennett worked exclusively for
ME&LS and did no work for MEI. Moreover, Bennett's own resignation letter calls for
the repurchase of his membership interest, tacitly admitting that his resignation was
deemed a withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS.
For those reasons, as more fully explained in the Argument section below,
this Court should rule that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the Operating
Agreement and the Second Amendment.

The Court should hold that Bennett's

resignation brought about his withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS, and should reverse
the Judgment and the underlying Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ME&LS PROPERLY APPEALS THE JUDGMENT
AND THE UNDERLYING ORDERS.
ME&LS has properly appealed both the Judgment and the underlying
Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008. The District Court certified the
Judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Notice of
Appeal properly states that the appeal is taken from the Judgment and each of the
underlying Orders.
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A.

The Judgment is Properly Certified as Final.
A party may appeal all final orders and judgments from a district court

except as otherwise provided by law. Powell, et al v. Cannon, et al, 2008 UT 19, ^[11,
179 P.3d 799; Utah R. App. P. 3(a). A judgment that does not dispose of all claims
below is still appealable "when the district court certifies [it] as final under rule 54(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Powell, 2008 UT 19, f l 3 ; see also Bradbury,
et al v. Valencia, et al, 2000 UT 50, TJ12, 5 P.3d 649; Don Houston, M.D., Inc., et al v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., et al, 933 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The Utah Supreme Court has identified three requirements for proper
certification under Rule 54(b). First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple
parties to the action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered on an
order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the
action. Third, the trial court in its discretion must make a determination that "there is no
just reason for delay" of the appeal.

Kennecott Corp., et al v. Utah State Tax

Commission, et al, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991) {quoting Pate v. Marathon Steel
Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984)).
In this case, all three requirements have been satisfied. As indicated above,
there are multiple claims for relief and multiple parties in this action. Also, the ruling
upon which the Judgment was entered would be appealable as a final order but for the
fact that there are claims or parties remaining in the case below. The District Court
ordered ME&LS to pay $142,174.93 to Bennett by certified check delivered "no later
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than 5:00 p.m. on April 1, 2008." (Addendum 5.) But for the other claims and parties
remaining in the case, this would have been a final order appealable without certification.
Finally, the District Court exercised its discretion and determined that
appeal of the Judgment should not be delayed. This Court's Memorandum Decision in
the prior appeal held that the Order and Judgment of April 3, 2008 was not properly
certified as final under Rule 54(b), and the appeal was dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Then the District Court entered an Amended Order Certifying Order
and Judgment as Final on October 19, 2010 (the "Amended Order"). This Amended
Order follows the instructions of the Memorandum Decision and the requirements of
Rule 54(b). It makes the express direction for entry of afinaljudgment as to one or more
but fewer than all the claims or parties in this action. It also states: "The Court also
determines that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal from the Order and
Judgment." (Addendum 8.) The Amended Order then makes the determination that the
operative facts underlying the claims on appeal are separate and distinct from those
underlying the claims which remain in the District Court. (Addendum 8.)
For those reasons, this Court should conclude that the Amended Order
satisfies each of the requirements for proper certification under Rule 54(b). Based
thereon the Court should hold that the Judgment was properly certified as final and that
the Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
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B.

The Notice of Appeal Properly Identifies the Judgment and the
Underlying Orders.
Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the notice

of appeal "shall designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from ...."
Utah R. App. P. 3(d). The Rule generally does not require an appellant to "indicate that
the appeal also concerns intermediate orders or events that have led to that final
judgment." Zions First National Bank, N.A. v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation Co,, et al, 931
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1997); see also U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 1999 UT App
303, fflflO-23, 990 P.2d 945 (and several cases cited therein). If a party appeals a final
judgment that is unrelated to an earlier summary judgment ruling, however, then
Rule 3(d) requires the notice to explicitly state that the earlier ruling is being appealed, or
the appellate court lacks jurisdiction over it. Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, et
ai9 1999 UT 10,ffi[7-9,977 P.2d 474.
In this case the Notice of Appeal explicitly states that ME&LS appeals
from the Judgment and also from the Orders entered December 21, 2006 and April 2,
2008. (See Addendum 9.) The underlying Orders are related because the Judgment is
premised on the ruling that Bennett was still a Member of ME&LS. Thus, the Notice of
Appeal fully complies with the requirements of Rule 3(d) under either the general rule
stated in Rocky Mountain Irrigation or the exception described in Jensen, This Court has
jurisdiction to review the Judgment and each of the underlying Orders.
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POINT II
BENNETT CEASED TO BE A MEMBER OF ME&LS UPON
RESIGNING HIS EMPLOYMENT,
a.

Bennett's Employment.
It is undisputed that from the time ME&LS was created in late 1996,

Bennett was a leased employee. While technically employed by MEI, Bennett was
leased to and worked exclusively for ME&LS. (R. 6583-6585.)
employees were leased employees.

(R. 6627-6628.)

All of ME&LS'

Bennett was responsible for

directing the work of other leased employees of ME&LS. (R. 6571, 6699.)
Bennett's argument and the District Court's Order focused on the word
"employment" in Section 12.3(a) of the Second Amendment. {See Addendum 2 at 3; see
also Addendum 4.) The word "employment" is not defined in the Operating Agreement
or in the Second Amendment. The District Court's Order narrowly construed it to
exclude leased employment, and the interpretation was improper for the reasons set forth
below.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[i]n the interpretation of a contract,
the parties' intentions are controlling." Turner v. Hi-Country Homeowner's Assn., 910
P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996). "When parties to a contract disagree about the meaning of
a provision, principles of contract interpretation require us to give effect to the meaning
intended by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement." Uintah Basin
Medical Center v. Hardy, M.D., 2005 UT App 92, f 12, 110 P.3d 168. When the contract
is not ambiguous, the Court determines the intent of the parties from the plain meaning of
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the contract language. Id.
Organic documents creating a business entity are interpreted as a contract.
Dansie, et al v. City ofHerriman, et al, 2006 UT 23,ffi[5-6,134, P.3d 1139 (articles of
incorporation); Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, 1ffll3-l4, 94 P.3d 193
(shareholder agreements); Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Association, 2005 UT App
327, Tfl4, 120 P.3d 34 (articles of incorporation for non-profit corporation).

The

interpretation of such a contract must make sense based upon the nature of the business
entity and the person's ownership interest. Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, ^[16.
Utah courts have also held that in the construction of contracts and statutes,
words "which are used in common, daily, non-technical speech, should, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they have for laymen in such
daily usage." Mesa Development Co.} Inc. v. Sandy City Corp., 948 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) {quoting Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675
(Utah 1982)). In Mesa Development this Court considered the definition of the word
"resident" in a standard non-legal dictionary "as a helpful guide to its general meaning."
Mesa Development, 948 P.2d at 369.
Here, the word "employment" is a common term used in daily, nontechnical speech.

It means the "activity in which one engages or is employed."

Merriam-Webster

OnLine,

<http://www.Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary>.

This

definition supports an interpretation of "employment" that focuses on the work an
employee performs in his or her job and the company for whom the work is done. The
common, ordinary meaning of "employment" is not limited to a technical legal
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relationship the employee may have with a leasing employer for whom he or she does no
work. Utah case law and statutes hold that the substance of the employment relationship
is found where the leased employee does his or her work.
This Court has held in such circumstances that the term '"Employment' is
broadly defined and liberally construed ...."

Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of

Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, et al, 111 P.2d 1110, 1113 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). In that case, Pro-Benefit leased employees to various clients and the employees
did their work for those clients. For purposes of the Employment Security Act this Court
held that the client, and not Pro-Benefit, was the employer of the leased employees. ProBenefit lacked "the requisite decision-making power to qualify as an employer." Id. at
1113. The client performed all of the essential elements of an employer's role. The
leased employees were held to be employees of the client where they did all of their
work, and not employees of Pro-Benefit who was only their technical employer. Id. at
1113-14. Thus, the client and not Pro-Benefit was responsible for paying unemployment
contributions for the leased employees. Id. at 1114.
Various provisions of the Utah Code also treat a leased employee as in the
employment of the lessee or client where the employee does his or her work.

For

example, the Workers Compensation Act provides that in the case of a "professional
employer organization," which is often an employee leasing company, "the client ... is
considered the employer of a covered employee" and is required to secure workers
compensation benefits for the leased employee. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-103(3)(a). The
policy of this statute thus focuses on the "client" company where the leased employees do
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their work.
In another context, a Utah statute provides that the term "member" of the
Utah State Retirement System "includes leased employees within the meaning of
Section 414(n)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code ...." Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-102(25).
Thus, leased employees may participate in a retirement system through the government
entity where they work, even though their technical employer is a leasing company.
These authorities support the conclusion that the word "employment"
should be broadly interpreted to mean the work in which Bennett engaged or was
employed, and should focus on ME&LS where all of his work was done.

His

"employment" under Section 12.3(a) of the Second Amendment thus includes his leased
employment with ME&LS.
B.

Bennett's Resignation.
Section 12.1 of the Second Amendment provides that: "A person shall

cease to be a Member upon the happening of any of the following events: (a) the
withdrawal of a Member ...." (Addendum 2 at 2 (emphasis added).) Section 12.3(a)
states: "For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be deemed to withdraw when the
member voluntarily resigns or terminates the Member's employment with the
Company fME&LS] for reasons other than bankruptcy, death, disability or
incompetency." (Id. at 3 (emphasis added).)
On August 17, 2005, Bennett tendered the Resignation Letter and
voluntarily resigned his employment in order to "pursue other options." (Addendum 3.)
Because Bennett was and always had been a leased employee of ME&LS, the resignation
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"voluntarily ... terminate^]" his leased employment with ME&LS as well as his
technical employment relationship with MEI. Bennett concedes he no longer worked for
ME&LS or any other McNeil company after his resignation. (R. 6588.) Before his
resignation Bennett performed all of his work for ME&LS and did no work for MEI. (R.
6583-6585.) In fact, Bennett's Resignation Letter states he spent an "incredible" amount
of time "building the reputation and profitability of McNeil Engineering and Land
Surveying, L.C." (Addendum 3 at 2; R. 6631.) Bennett said he had "a key role in the
success of [ME&LS] ever since it has been organized." (Addendum 3 at 1; R. 6630.)
His work for ME&LS was "employment" because it was the "activity in which [he]
engage[d] or [was] employed."

Merriam-Webster OnLine, <http://www.Merriam-

Webster.com/dictionary>. The word is "broadly defined and liberally construed" in Utah
law. Pro-Benefit, 111 P.2d at 1113. This Court should broadly and liberally interpret the
word "employment" in Section 12.3(a) to include Bennett's leased employment at
ME&LS. (Addendum 2 at 3.)
It ignores reality to argue, as Bennett does, that his resignation only
terminated his technical legal relationship with MEI and not his leased employment with
ME&LS, where all of his work was done. Clearly, all of his work for ME&LS ended
with his resignation. (R. 6588.) Bennett voluntarily "terminate[d]" his work for ME&LS
when he resigned from MEI. It also defies logic to maintain, as Bennett does, that he had
no "employment" with ME&LS where he did all of his work, and had "employment"
only with MEI where he did no work. Bennett withdrew as a Member of ME&LS when
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he resigned on August 17, 2005 because the resignation voluntarily terminated his
employment with ME&LS.
By its Order of December 21, 2006, the District Court ruled that because
Bennett was a leased employee he had no "employment" at ME&LS within the meaning
of Section 12.3, and the provisions of the Second Amendment did not apply. This unduly
narrow interpretation erroneously excludes leased employees and ignores the undisputed
fact that ME&LS had nothing but leased employees. (R. 6571, 6699.) These facts were
known to Bennett and the other Members when they signed the Second Amendment.
ME&LS had been in business with nothing but leased employees for nearly 5 years by
the time the Second Amendment was signed, and each Member who signed it was
himself a leased employee.

Moreover, the Order ignores the common practice of

employee leasing among Utah businesses which is reflected by the authorities cited
above. This Court should conclude that the District Court's ruling was in error, and
accordingly should reverse the Orders and the Judgment.

POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD GIVE EFFECT TO ALL CONTRACT
PROVISIONS AND IGNORE NONE.
A.

Abundant Utah Case Law.
It is well established in Utah law that a contract should be interpreted "in an

attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions." Nielsen v.
O'Reilly, et aL, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992); Kraatzv. Heritage Imports, et ai9 2003
UT App 201,1f26, 71 P.3d 188 (same); Chase v. Scott, et aL, 2001 UT App 404, ^[20, 38
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P.3d 1001 (same); Lee, et al v. Barnes, et al, 1999 UT App 126, f l l , 977 P.2d 550.
"Each contract provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view
toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) {citing Utah Valley Bank v.
Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah 1981)); Richins Drilling Inc. v. Golf Services
Group, Inc., et al, 2008 UT App 262, 1(15, 189 P.3d 1280 (the Court should avoid an
interpretation which would render contract provisions "meaningless") (Davis, J.,
concurring and dissenting). The Court will "presume" that the contract language "was
included for the purpose stated and ... give [it] effect according to its usual and ordinary
meaning." Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wright, etal, 770 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (citing Marriot v. Pacific National Life Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182,
467 P.2d 981 (1970)).
Under these rules of construction Utah courts have rejected contract
interpretations that would render a provision meaningless or create an absurd result. For
example, in Novell, Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 UT App 162, 92 P.3d 768, this
Court interpreted a contract provision relating to computer source codes. The Court
rejected the defendant's interpretation of the term "proceeds" because it would "render
meaningless the deductions portion of the definition of 'Gross Revenue.'" Id. f27. In
Kraatz, this Court rejected an interpretation of the term "costs" which "would reduce the
costs and fees recovery provision 'to absurdity.'" Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201, ^[26-28.
The interpretation "would render other parts of the contract meaningless." Id. f32.
Finally, in Okelberry, the Court rejected the plaintiffs interpretation that every time
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cattle die or are sold the shareholder would lose shares, and every time a calf is bom the
shareholder would gain shares. The Court stated: "The corporate secretary would be
voiding and issuing shares on a daily basis.

We may not endorse such an absurd

interpretation^ Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, ^|24 (emphasis added).
B.

Cafe Rio.
In the recent decision of Cafe Rio, Inc., et al v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton,

LLC, 2009 UT 27, 207 P.3d 1235, the Utah Supreme Court applied this rule of
construction to interpret a cross-easement agreement. The case illustrates how Utah
courts apply the rule to resolve competing interpretations of contract language. LarkinGifford-Overton ("LGO") owned a parcel of commercial property in St. George, Utah.
The VeraR. Hughes Grandchildren's Trust (the "Trust") owned an adjacent parcel, of
which Cafe Rio was a tenant. LGO, the Trust, and four other adjacent property owners
signed a cross-easement agreement establishing open space in the center of the six
parcels as common areas and governing the use of those common areas. Cafe Rio, 2009
UT 27, 6,1Hf8-l0. Later, LGO began constructing a new building on its parcel. Cafe Rio
and the Trust filed suit to enjoin the construction claiming it was an "obstruction"
prohibited by the cross-easement agreement.

{Id. ^|14.)

The district court granted

summary judgment for the Trust and Cafe Rio, interpreting the cross-easement agreement
to prohibit LGO's building construction. (Id. ^17.)
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the judgment below.
Construing multiple provisions of the cross-easement agreement, the Court ruled that it
must "'consider each contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view
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toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27, ^[25 {quoting
Green River Canal Co, v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ^[17, 84 P.3d 1134). Interpreting the word
'"obstruction' to include buildings would eviscerate LGO's ability to construct a building
on Parcel 5 - a right explicitly bargained and provided for. We will not interpret a
general contractual term such that it renders an explicit right meaningless'' Cafe Rio,
2009 UT 27, T[33 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary
judgment was reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of LGO.
(/J. 1|38.)
In the present case, the ruling in Cafe Rio applies with equal force. To
accept Bennett's narrow interpretation of "employment," as the District Court did,
eliminates the possibility of withdrawal upon a Member's resignation and would do away
with ME&LS' right to repurchase that Member's interest. These are explicit rights
bargained for in the Operating Agreement and the Second Amendment. Following the
Supreme Court's guidance, this Court should not "interpret a general contractual term
[employment] such that it renders an explicit right meaningless." Cafe Rio, 2009 UT 27,
1f33.
C.

The Second Amendment.
Applying these rules of construction to the Second Amendment requires

reversal of the Judgment and the underlying Orders. The District Court's interpretation
of the word "employment" to exclude leased employment renders most of the Second
Amendment meaningless. The decision nullifies parts of Sections 12.1 and 12.2 and
nearly all of Section 12.3 by holding they do not apply to leased employees.
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(Addendum 4; R. 3121.)

The obvious intent of the withdrawal provisions in

Sections 12.1 and 12.3 was to create a mechanism for ME&LS to break ties with a
Member who resigns and to provide for repurchase of the Member's interest. Bennett
does not dispute that this was the intended purpose. (R. 6697-6708.) The language
plainly shows the Members intended withdrawal to occur upon resignation; in fact,
resignation was the primary event that would trigger withdrawal. (Addendum 2 at 3.)
Under the District Court's ruling, however, no Member could ever withdraw from
ME&LS by resigning. Narrowly construing the word "employment" to exclude leased
employment thus frustrates the intended purpose of the Second Amendment.
Moreover, the District Court's ruling leads to the absurd result that the
Second Amendment could never apply to the Members of ME&LS, the very people for
whom it was written. The only kind of "employment" anyone ever had with ME&LS
was leased employment. Bennett admits he worked exclusively for ME&LS as a leased
employee (R. 6583-6585) but contends he had no "employment" with the company.1 If a
leased employee had no "employment" then no one ever had "employment" at ME&LS,
and no Member would ever withdraw from ME&LS by voluntary resignation. Thus, the
Second Amendment would become a wasted and futile effort.
The District Court's ruling also leads to the absurd result of Bennett
remaining a Member after he chose to leave and form his own engineering firm in
1

Bennett makes the illogical argument that "a member who was employed by ME&LS
directly could resign membership by resigning employment." (R. 6705.) Yet that
argument flies in the face of Bennett's admission that all ME&LS employees were leased
employees and no one was ever employed "directly" by ME&LS. (R. 2569, 6583-6585,
6627-6628.)
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competition with ME&LS. It allows Bennett to keep one foot on each side of the fence,
by earning profits from his own new firm and still demanding a share of profits from
ME&LS. This result is flatly contrary to Bennett's intent and that of other Members as
reflected in the language of Section 12.3 of the Second Amendment. (Addendum 2 at 3.)
The Resignation Letter states Bennett's intent by including his request that ME&LS
repurchase his membership interest. (Addendum 3 at 2.)
It is significant to note that Section 12.3 did not exist in the original
Operating Agreement. (See Addendum 1.) That document has only one brief reference
to withdrawal of a Member in Section 12.1, which required a majority consent of the
Members. (Id)

Some five years after ME&LS was formed, however, all Members

including Bennett signed the Second Amendment which added Section 12.3 and created a
process for withdrawal "when the Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the
Member's employment with the Company ...."

(Addendum 2, § 12.3(a).)

Under

Bennett's argument, they signed a contract that could never have any effect. They
provided for the resignation of "employment" from a company which, under Bennett's
theory, had no "employment" whatsoever. Bennett's interpretation, as adopted in the
Orders and the Judgment, renders Section 12.3 meaningless and of no effect.
By contrast, ME&LS' interpretation would give effect to all provisions of
the Operating Agreement and the Second Amendment. Its interpretation is that the word
"employment" was meant to include "leased employment" because that is the only kind
of employment anyone ever had with ME&LS. This interpretation gives effect to all
contract provisions and ignores none.

Withdrawal is possible as the Members
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contemplated when a voluntary resignation terminates the Member's employment. The
repurchase of the Member's interest would then occur as the Second Amendment
provides.

No provision of the Operating Agreement or the Second Amendment is

rendered meaningless by this interpretation and there will be no absurd result. Under
established Utah law, therefore, the Court should adopt this interpretation and rule that
the word "employment" includes Bennett's leased employment and that the resignation
triggered his withdrawal as a Member of ME&LS.

POINT IV
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT
"EMPLOYMENT" INCLUDES LEASED EMPLOYMENT.
If the question cannot be resolved within the four corners of the contract,
then the Court should consider extrinsic evidence about the meaning of the word
"employment." The issue of whether a contract is ambiguous is decided by the Court as
a matter of law. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, <[|13. A contract provision is ambiguous if it is
capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies.

Fair bourn Commercial Inc. v.

American Housing Partners, Inc., 2004 UT 54, ^flO, 94 P.3d 292 {citing Winegarv.
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991)).
However, a contract provision is not ambiguous just because one party
gives that provision a different meaning than another party does.

To demonstrate

ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties each much be "tenable." The Canopy
Group, 2004 UT App 162, f24. To be tenable, an interpretation must make sense in light
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of the facts surrounding the creation of the contract and the nature of the organization
involved. See Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, \ 16; Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, |12. The
Court should avoid finding ambiguities as the result of a "forced or strained construction"
of the contract. Utah Transit Authority v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co., Inc.,
2006 UT App 46, f 12, 131 P.3d 288.
Moreover, "[a] construction given to a contractual provision by the acts and
conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as
to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will when reasonable, be adopted and
enforced by the court." Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, fl6.
In determining whether a contract is ambiguous the Court is not bound to
consider only the language of the contract itself. Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp., et al,
2002 UT 43, ^[19, 48 P.3d 918. Any relevant evidence must be considered so the Court
can place itself in the same situation the parties found themselves at the time of
contracting. Id. (citing Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah
1995)). "The only evidence relevant to that inquiry is evidence of facts known to the
parties at the time they entered the [agreement]."

Yeargin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax

Commission, 2001 UT 11, ^[39, 20 P.3d 287.
In this case, to decide whether the word "employment" is ambiguous, the
Court should consider at least the following relevant evidence known to the parties at the
time the Second Amendment was signed:
1.

From its inception ME&LS leased all of its employees from MEL

Thus, the only kind of "employment" ME&LS ever had was leased employment.
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2.

Bennett and each other Member of ME&LS who signed the Second

Amendment were working as leased employees of ME&LS at the time of contracting,
and had been for nearly 5 years.
3.

Bennett worked exclusively for ME&LS and did no work for MEL

4.

All of the employees worked for the limited liability companies and

not for MEL Bennett testified "everything ... was supposed to have gone through the
LCs, as far as the jobs, and that [MEI] was more of an administration ...." (R. 2569,
6585.)
5.

Bennett was responsible for directing other leased employees of

ME&LS.
In light of these facts known to the parties when they signed the Second
Amendment, this Court may easily hold that the word "employment" includes Bennett's
leased employment with ME&LS. Because each Member of ME&LS was a leased
employee, it is unreasonable to suggest they meant the word "employment" to exclude
leased employment.

Bennett's attempt to narrow the general meaning of the word

"employment" to exclude leased employment would strain its interpretation beyond
anything possibly intended by the Members.
Moreover, a construction given to a contract provision "by the acts and
conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before any controversy has arisen as
to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will when reasonable, be adopted and
enforced by the Court." Okelberry, 2005 UT App 327, ^[16. Here, Bennett's Resignation
Letter reveals that he in fact believed his resignation was a withdrawal which required the
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repurchase of his membership interest. The Resignation Letter states Bennett expected to
"receive at least current book value for my 252 interests ... in a timely manner."
(Addendum 3 at 2.) By that statement Bennett tacitly admits he was resigning or
terminating his employment with ME&LS which he knew would give ME&LS the option
to repurchase his membership interest.

No other event had occurred besides his

resignation which could bring about his "dissociation" as a Member, e.g., bankruptcy,
expulsion, death, or disability. (Addendum 2, § 12.1.) Nothing else could trigger the
repurchase of Bennett's membership interest except his withdrawal by resignation.
Giving "great weight" to this statement supports the conclusion that Bennett understood
his resignation terminated his employment with ME&LS.
For those reasons, the consideration of extrinsic evidence supports the
interpretation that the word "employment" includes Bennett's leased employment with
ME&LS. After considering this extrinsic evidence, the Court should conclude that
ME&LS' interpretation is reasonably supported by the language of the Second
Amendment, and that the evidence is admissible to resolve conflicting interpretations of
the word "employment." The Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^[19, 48 P.3d 918 {quoting
Ward, 907 P.2d at 268).
D.

Alternatively, the Issue Should be Remanded for Trial.
In the alternative, if the Court finds there are issues of fact with respect to

the Members' intent concerning the Operating Agreement and the Second Amendment,
then the Court should reverse the Judgment and the Orders accordingly. If this Court
concludes there are genuine issues of material fact as to the meaning of term
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"employment" in the Second Amendment, then the Court should reverse the Judgment
and the underlying Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008 as improperly entered
under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue of whether Bennett
withdrew as a Member of ME&LS then should be remanded for trial
POINT V
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDED ENTRY OF THE JUDGMENT.
If the Court affirms the District Court's interpretation of the word
"employment," as set forth in the Orders of December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008, the
Court nevertheless should hold that the District Court improperly entered the Judgment
because of genuine issues of fact in the record. The Judgment was entered upon
Bennett's motion and not after an evidentiary hearing or trial. Accordingly, it should be
reviewed under the standards for summary judgments in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The Judgment should be reversed for at least two reasons. First, the record
contains genuine issues of material fact as to whether Bennett is entitled to the amount
awarded, even if he is determined to be a Member of ME&LS. Most of the amount
awarded in the Judgment is a share of "guaranteed payments" that ME&LS made to its
Members in 2006, and Bennett was not entitled to a share of such guaranteed payments.
In January 2006, shortly after Bennett left ME&LS, the Members agreed
that profits of the company should be paid based on "productivity" instead of ownership
interest. (R. 6530-6532.) Duffm advised ME&LS that tax law allows an LLC to pay
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guaranteed payments to its Members based on their service, production, or capital.
(R. 6538-6542.) A "guaranteed payment" is a payment made by a partnership to a
partner for services or the use of capital and is determined without regard to the income
of the partnership.2 See 26 U.S.C. § 707; see also 26 C.F.R. §1.707-1 (c). ME&LS
wanted to make guaranteed payments to the people who were performing services for the
company. (R. 6543-6546.) Because Bennett had left and was no longer performing
services for ME&LS, he was not entitled to a share of guaranteed payments.
Second, any amount Bennett may claim as a share of distributions or
guaranteed payments is subject to an offset by the damages claims of ME&LS against
Bennett. Following the hearing held December 11, 2007 and the District Court's Order
of January 29, 2008, ME&LS has damages claims pending against Bennett which require
a trial on the merits. The District Court ruled that those claims present genuine issues of
fact which must be resolved by the jury. The District Court also acknowledged that
Bennett did not contest Plaintiffs' evidence of damages arising from these claims.
(R. 6562.) Damages based upon those claims could more than offset any amounts that
may be due to Bennett.
Therefore, even if this Court concludes Bennett is still a Member of
ME&LS, the Court should reverse the Judgment and remand for a trial on the issues of
whether Bennett is entitled to a share of guaranteed payments made by ME&LS after

2

A limited liability company may elect to be taxed as a corporation, an S-corporation, or
a partnership. ME&LS elected to be taxed as a partnership. (R. 5293-5294.)
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Bennett's resignation, and whether any such amount would be offset by ME&LS'
damages claims against Bennett.
CONCLUSION
For those reasons, the Court should apply governing principles of Utah
contract law by interpreting the common, ordinary meaning of the word "employment,"
and by giving effect to all provisions of the Operating Agreement and the Second
Amendment and ignoring none of them. The Court should consider extrinsic evidence in
its review, at least preliminarily.

The Court should then conclude that Bennett's

resignation terminated his leased employment with ME&LS and triggered his withdrawal
as a Member. Based thereon, the Court should reverse the Judgment and the Orders of
December 21, 2006 and April 2, 2008. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the
Judgment because there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Bennett is entitled to a
share of guaranteed payments made to ME&LS Members, and as to whether any such
amount would be offset by ME&LS' damages claims against Bennett.
DATED this _2"day of February, 2011.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

kXTTHEW C.

^ S J E C K ^

Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM 1

OPERATING AGREEMENT
OF
McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, LC

This Operating Agreement of McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING,
L.C., a limited liability company organized pursuant to the Utah Limited Liability Company
Act, is entered into and shall be effective as of the Effective Date, by and among the Company
and the persons executing this Agreement as Members.

ARTICLE I
DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this Operating Agreement (as defined below), unless the context
clearly indicates otherwise, the following terms shall have the following meanings:
1.1
Act.

Act - The Utah Limited Liability Company Act and all amendments to the

1.2
Additional Member - A Member other than an Initial Member or a Substitute
Member who has acquired a Membership Interest from the Company.
L3
Admission Agreement - The Agreement between an Additional Member and
the Company described in Article XIII.
1.4
Articles - The Articles of Organization of the Company as properly adopted
and amended from time to time by the Members and filed with the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code.
1.5
Assignee - A transferee of a Membership Interest who has not been admitted
as a Substituted Member.
1.6
Bankrupt Member - A member who: (a) has become the subject of an Order
for Relief under the United States Bankruptcy Code, (b) has initiated, either in an
original Proceeding or by way of answer in any state insolvency or receivership
proceeding, an action for liquidation arrangement, composition, readjustment,
dissolution, or similar relief.
1.7

Capital Account - The account maintained for a Member or Assignee
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determined in accordance with Article VIIL
L8
Capital Contribution - Any contribution of Property, services or the
obligation to contribute Property or services made by or on behalf of a Member or
Assignee.
1.9

Code - The Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended from time to time.

1.10 Company - McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, LC, a
limited liability companyformed under the laws of Utah, and any successor limited
liability company.
1.11 Operating Agreement - This Operating Agreement including all Admission
Agreements and amendments adopted in accordance with the Operating Agreement and
the Act.
1.12 Company Liability - Any enforceable debt or obligation for which the
Company is liable or which is secured by any Company Property.
1.13 Company Minimum Gain - An amount determined by first computing for
each Company Nonrecourse Liability any gain the Company would realize if it
disposed of the Company Property subject to that liability for no consideration other
than full satisfaction of the liability, and then aggregating the separately computed
gains. The amount of Company Minimum Gain includes such minimum gain arising
from a conversion, refinancing, or other change to a debt instrument, only to the extent
a Member is allocated a share of that minimum gain. For any Taxable Year, the net
increase or decrease in Company Minimum Gain is determined by comparing the
Company Minimum Gain on the last day of the immediately preceding Taxable Year
with the Minimum Gain on the last day of the current Taxable Year. Notwithstanding
any provision to the contrary contained herein, Company Minimum Gain and increases
and decreases in Company Minimum Gain are intended to be computed in accordance
with §704 of the Code the Regulations issued thereunder, as the same may be issued
and interpreted from time to time. A Members share of Company Minimum Gain at
the end of any Taxable Year equals: the sum of Nonrecourse Deductions allocated to
that Member (and to that Member's predecessors in interest) up to that time and the
distributions made to that Member predecessors in interest) up to that time and the
distributions made to that Member (and to that Member's predecessors in interest) up to
that time of proceeds of a nonrecourse liability allocable to an increase in Company
Minimum Gain minus the sum of that Member's (and that Member's predecessors' in
interest) aggregate share of the net decreases in Company Minimum Gain plus their
2
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aggregate share of decreases resulting from revaluations of Company Property subject
to one or more Company Nonrecourse Liabilities.
1.14 Company Nonrecourse Liability - A company Liability to the extent that no
Member or Related Person bears the economic risk of loss (as defined in §1.752-2 of
the Regulations) with respect to the liability.
1.15 Default Interest Rate - The then-current prime rate quoted by the largest
commercial bank in the jurisdiction of the Principal Office plus two percent.
1.16 Distribution - A transfer of Property to a member on account of a
Membership Interest as described in Article IX.
1.17 Disposition (Dispose) - Any sale, assignment, transfer, exchange, mortgage,
pledge, grant hypothecation, or other transfer, absolute or as security or encumbrance
(including dispositions by operation of law).
1.18 Dissociation - Any action which causes a Person to cease to be Member as
described in Article XII hereof.
1.19 Dissolution Event - An event, the occurrence of which will result in the
dissolution of the Company under Article XIV unless the Members agree to the
contrary.
1.20

Effective Date - January 1, 1997.

\y\
Immediate Family - A Member's Immediate Family includes the Member's
spouse, children (including natural, adopted and stepchildren), grandchildren, parents,
and siblings.
1.22 Initial Capital Contribution - The Capital Contribution agreed to be made by
the Initial Members as described in Article VIII.
1.23 Initial Members - Those persons identified on Exhibit A attached hereto and
made a part hereof by this reference who have executed this Operating Agreement.
1.24 Majority - The affirmative vote or consent of Members described as a
"Majority" in Article VI hereof.
1.25

Management Right - The right of a Member to participate in the management
3
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of the Company, including the rights to information and to consent or approve actions
of the Company.
1.26 Managers - Two Members selected to manage the affairs of the Company under
Article VII hereof.
1.27 Member - Initial Member, Substituted Member or Additional Member, and,
unless the context expressly indicates to the contrary, includes Managers and
Assignees.
1.28 Member Minimum Gain - An amount determined by first computing for each
Member Nonrecourse Liability any gain the Company would realize if it disposed of
the Company Property subject to that liability for no consideration other than full
satisfaction of the liability, and then aggregating the separately computed gains. The
amount of Member Minimum Gain includes such minimum gain arising from a
conversion, refinancing, or other change to a debt instrument, only to the extent a
Member is allocated a share of that minimum gain. For any Taxable Year, the net
increase or decrease in member Minimum Gain is determined by comparing the
Member Minimum Gain on the last day of the immediately preceding Taxable Year
with the Minimum Gain on the last day of the current Taxable Year. Notwithstanding
any provision to the contrary contained herein, Member Minimum Gain and increases
and decreases in member Minimum Gain are intended to be computed in accordance
with §704 of the Code the Regulations issued thereunder, as the same may be issued
and interpreted from time to time.
1.29 Member Nonrecourse Liability- Any Company Liability to the extent the
liability is nonrecourse under state law, and on which a Member or Related Person
bears the economic risk of loss under §1.752-2 of the Code because, for example, the
Member or Related Person is the creditor or a guarantor.
1.30 Membership Interest - The rights of a Member or, in the case of an
Assignee, the rights of the assigning Member in Distributions (liquidating or otherwise)
and allocations of the profits, losses, gains, deductions, and credits of the Company.
1.31 Net Losses - The losses and deductions of the Company determined in
accordance with accounting principles consistently applied from year to year employed
under the method of accounting adopted by the Company and as reported separately or
in the aggregate, as appropriate, on the tax return of the Company filed for federal
income tax purposes.
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1.32 Net Profits - The income and gains of the Company determined in accordance
with accounting principles consistently applied from year to year employed under the
method of accounting adopted by the Company and as reported separately or in the
aggregate, as appropriate, on the tax return of the Company filed for federal income
tax purposes.
1.33 Nonrecourse Liabilities - Nonrecourse liabilities include Company
Nonrecourse Liabilities and Member Nonrecourse Liabilities.
1.34 Notice - Notice shall be in writing. Notice to the Company shall be
considered given when mailed by first class mail postage prepaid addressed to the
Managers in care of the Company at the address of Principal Office. Notice to a
Member shall be considered given when mailed by first class mail postage prepaid
addressed to the Member at the address reflected in the Operating Agreement, unless
the Member has given the Company a Notice of a different address.
1.35 Offsettable Decrease - Any allocation that unexpectedly causes or increases a
deficit in the Members Capital Account as of the end of the taxable year to which the
allocation relates attributable to depletion allowances under §1.704(b)(2)(iv)(k) of the
Regulations, allocations of loss and deductions under §§704(e)(2) or 706 of the Code or
under §1.751-1 of the Regulations, or distributions that, as of the end of the year are
reasonably expected to be made to the extent they exceed the offsetting increases to
such Members Capital Account that reasonably are expected to occur during (or prior
to) the taxable years in which the such distributions are expected to be made (other than
increases pursuant to a Minimum Gain Chargeback).
1.36 Organization - A Person other than a natural person. Organization includes,
without limitation, corporations (both non-profit and other corporations), partnerships
(both limited and general), joint ventures, limited liability companies, grantor trusts
and unincorporated associations, but the term does not include joint tenancies and
tenancies by the entirety.
1.37 Organization Expenses - Those expenses incurred in the organization of the
Company including the costs of preparation of the Operating Agreement and Articles.
1 ^ ^ Permitted Transferee - Any member of the Member's Immediate Family, or
an Organization controlled by such Member or by members of the Member's
Immediate Family.
1.39

Person - An individual, trust, estate, or any incorporated or unincorporated
5
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organization permitted to be a member of a limited liability company under the laws of
Utah.
1.40 Proceeding - Any administrative, judicial, or other adversary proceeding,
including, without limitation, litigation, arbitration, administrative adjudication,
mediation, and appeal or review of any of the foregoing.
1.41 Property - Any property real or personal, tangible or intangible, including
money and any legal or equitable interest in such property, but excluding services and
promises to perform services in the future.
1.42 Regulations - Except where the context indicates otherwise, the permanent,
temporary, proposed, or proposed and temporary regulations of Department of the
Treasury under the Code as such regulations may be lawfully changed from time to
time.
1.43 Related Person - A person having a relationship to a Member that is described
in §1.752-4(b) of the Regulations.
1.44 Sharing Ratio - With respect to any Member, a fraction (expressed as a
percentage), the numerator of which is the total of the Member's Capital Account and
the denominator is the total of all Capital Accounts of all Members and Assignees.
1.45 Substitute Member - An assignee who has been admitted to all of the rights
of membership pursuant to the Operating Agreement.
1.46 Taxable Year - The taxable year of the Company as determined pursuant to
§706 of the Code.
1.47 Taxing Jurisdiction - Any state, local, or foreign government that collects
tax, interest or penalties, however designated, on any member's share of the income or
gain attributable to the Company.
ARTICLE H
FORMATION
2.1
Organization - The Members hereby organize the Company as a Utah limited
liability company pursuant to the provisions of the Act.

6

ME 000042

2.2
Agreement - For and in consideration of the mutual covenants herein
contained and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of
which is hereby acknowledged, the Members executing this Operating Agreement
hereby agree to the terms and conditions of the Operating Agreement, as it may from
time to time be amended according to its terms. It is the express intention of the
Members that the Operating Agreement shall be the sole source of agreement of the
parties, and, except to the extent a provision of the Operating Agreement expressly
incorporates federal income tax rules by reference to sections of the Code or
Regulations or is expressly prohibited or ineffective under the Act, the Operating
Agreement shall govern, even when inconsistent with, or different than, the provisions
of the Act or any other law or rule. To the extent any provision of the Operating
Agreement is prohibited or ineffective under the Act, the Operating Agreement shall be
considered amended to the smallest degree possible in order to make the agreement
effective under the Act. In the event the Act is subsequently amended or interpreted in
such a way to make any provision of the Operating Agreement that was formerly
invalid valid, such provision shall be considered to be valid from the effective date of
such interpretation of amendment.
2.3
Name - The name of the Company is McNEBL ENGINEERING AND LAND
SURVEYING, LC.
2.4
Effective Date -This Operating Agreement shall become effective upon the
Effective Date, as defined in Article I.
2.5
Term - The Company shall be dissolved and its affairs wound up in
accordance with the Act and the Operating Agreement on December 31, 2036, unless
the term shall be extended by amendment to the Operating Agreement and the Articles
of Organization, or unless the Company shall be sooner dissolved and its affairs wound
up in accordance with the Act or the Operating Agreement.
2.6
Registered Agent and Office - The name and street address of the initial
agent for service of process required to be maintained by the Act is: Scott F. McNeil,
6895 South 900 East, Midvale, Utah 84047. The Managers, may, from time to time,
change the registered agent or office through appropriate filings with the Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code.
2.7
Principal Office - The Principal Office of the Company shall be located at:
6895 South 900 East, Midvale, Utah 84047.
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ARTICLE m
NATURE OF BUSINESS
The purpose of this Company is to engage in the business of providing civil
engineering and land surveying services and all related activities and any other lawful business
agreed by a Majority of the Members.

ARTICLE IV
ACCOUNTING AND RECORDS
4.1 Records to be Maintained - The Company shall maintain the following
records at the Principal Office:
4.1.1
A current list in alphabetical order of the full name and last
known business street address of each Member;
4.1.2
A copy of the Articles of Organization and all certificates of
amendment thereto, together with executed copies of any powers of
attorney pursuant to which any certificate of amendment has been
executed;
4.1.3
Copies of the Company's federal, state and local income tax
returns and reports, if any, for the three most recent years;
4.1.4
thereto;

Copies of the Operating Agreement including all amendments

4.1.5
Anyfinancialstatements of the Company for the three most
recent years;
4.L6
A writing or other data compilation from which information
can be obtained through retrieval devices into reasonably usable form
setting forth the following:
(a)
the amount of cash and a description and
statement of the agreed value of the other property or
services contributed by each Member and which each
Member has agreed to contribute;
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(b)
the times at which or events on the happening of
which any additional contributions agreed to be made by
each Member are to be made;
(c)
any right of a Member to receive distributions
which include a return of all or any part of the Member's
Capital Contribution; and
(d)
any events upon the happening of which the
Company is to be dissolved and its affairs wound up,
4.2

Reports to Members:
4.2.1
The Managers shall provide reports at least annually to the
Members other than Assignees at such time and in such manner as the
Managers may determine reasonable.
4.2.2.
The Managers shall provide all Members with those
information returns required by the Code and the Act.

4.3
Accounts - The Managers shall maintain a record of Capital Account for
each Member in accordance with Article VIII.

ARTICLE V
NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF MEMBERS
The names and addresses of the Initial Members are as reflected on Exhibit A attached
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.

ARTICLE VI
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MEMBERS
6.1
Management Rights - All Members (other than Assignees) who have
not Dissociated shall be entitled to vote on any matter submitted to a vote of the
Members. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the following actions require the
consent of a Majority of the Members:
(a)

any amendment to this Operating Agreement;
9
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(b)

the admission of Assignees to Management Rights; and

(c)

the continuation of the Company after a Dissolution Event.

6.2
Majority - Whenever any matter is required or allowed to be approved
by a Majority of the Members or a Majority of the Remaining Members under
the Act or the Operating Agreement, such matter shall be considered approved
or consented to upon the receipt of the affirmative approval or consent, either in
writing or at a meeting of the Members, of Members having Sharing Ratios in
excess of one half of the Sharing Ratios of all the Members entitled to vote on a
particular matter. Assignees and, in the case of approvals to withdrawal where
consent of the remaining Members is required, dissociating Members shall not
be considered Members entitled to vote for the purpose of determining a
Majority. In the case of a Member who has Disposed of that Member's entire
Membership Interest to an Assignee, but has not been removed as provided
below, the Sharing Ratio of such Assignee shall be considered in determining a
Majority and such Member's vote or consent shall be determined by such
Sharing Ratio.
6.3
Liability of Members - No Member shall be liable as such for the
liabilities of the Company. The failure of a limited liability company to observe
any formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its powers or
management of its business or affairs under this agreement or the Act shall not
be grounds for imposing personal liability on the Members or Managers for
liabilities of the limited liability company.
6.4
Indemnification - The Company shall indemnify the Members,
Managers, and agents for all costs, losses, liabilities, and damages paid or
accrued by such Member, Managers or agent in connection with the business of
the Company, to the fullest extent provided or allowed by the laws of the state
of Utah.
6.5
Representations and Warranties - Each member, and in the case of an
organization, the person(s) executing the Operating Agreement on behalf of the
organization, hereby represents and warrants to the Company and each other
Member that: (a) if that Member is a organization, that it is duly organized,
validly existing, and in good standing under the law of its state of organization
and that it has full organizational power to execute and agree to the Operating
Agreement to perform its obligations hereunder; (b) that the Member is
acquiring its interest in the Company for the Member's own account as an
10
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investment and without an intent to distribute the interest; (c) the Member
acknowledges that the interests have not been registered under the Securities Act
of 1933 or any state securities laws, and may not be resold or transferred by the
Member without appropriate registration or the availability of an exemption
from such requirements.
6.6

Conflicts of Interests
6.6.1
A Member, including a Manager, shall be entitled
to enter into transactions that may be considered to be competitive
with, or a business opportunity that may be beneficial to, the Company,
it being expressly understood that some of the Members may enter into
transactions into which the Company may enter. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Members shall account to the Company and hold as trustee
for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the Member, without
th6 consent of the other Members, in the conduct and winding up of the
Company business or from a use of appropriation by the Member of
Company property including information developed exclusively for the
Company and opportunities expressly offered to the Company.
6.6.2
A Member, including a Manager does not violate a duty or
obligation to the Company merely because the Member's conduct
furthers the Member's own interest. A Member may lend money to and
transact other business with the Company. The rights and obligations of
a Member who lends money to or transacts business with the Company
are the same as those of a person who is not a Member, subject to other
applicable law. No transaction with the Company shall be voidable
solely because a Member has a direct or indirect interest in the
transaction if either the transaction is fair to the Company or the
disinterested Managers or disinterested Members, in either case knowing
the material facts of the transaction and the Member's interest,
authorize, approve, or ratify the transaction.

ARTICLE VII
MANAGERS
7.1
Original Managers - The ordinary and usual decisions concerning the
business affairs of the Company shall be made by the Managers. The Managers
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must be Members of the Company. The initial Managers shall be Scott F.
McNeil and Dale K. Bennett,

7.2
Term of Office as Managers - No Manager shall have any contractual
right to such position. Each Manager shall serve until the earliest of (a) the
Dissociation of such Manager, or (b) the removal of the Manager.
7.3
Authority of Members to Bind the Company - The Members hereby
agree that only the Managers and authorized agents of the Company shall have
the authority to bind the Company. No Member other than a Manager shall
take any action as a Member to bind the Company, and shall indemnify the
Company for any costs or damages incurred by the Company as a result of the
unauthorized action of such Member. The Managers have the power, on behalf
of the Company, to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out the
business and affairs of the Company, including, without limitation:
(av)
the institution, prosecution and defense of any Proceeding
in the Company's name;
(b)
the purchase, receipt, lease or other acquisition, ownership,
holding, improvement, use and other dealing with, Property, wherever
located;
(c)
the sale, conveyance, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and
other disposition of Property;
(d)
the entering into contracts and guaranties; incurring of
liabilities; borrowing money, issuance of notes, bonds, and other
obligations; and the securing of any of its obligations by mortgage or
pledge of any of its Property or income;
(e)
the lending of money, investment and reinvestment of the
Company's funds, and receipt and holding of Property as security for
repayment, including, without limitation, the loaning of money to, and
otherwise helping Members, officers, employees, and agents;

(f)
the conduct of the Company's business, the establishment of
Company offices, and the exercise of the powers of the Company
within or without Utah;
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(g)
the appointment of employees and agents of the Company,
the defining of their duties and the establishment of their compensation;
(h)
the payment of pensions and establishment of pension plans,
pension trusts, profit sharing plans, and benefit and incentive plans
for all or any of the current or former Members, employees, and agents
of the Company;
(i)
the making of donations to the public welfare or for
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes;
(j)
the payment or donation, or any other act that furthers the
business and affairs of the Company;
(k)
the payment of compensation, or additional compensation to
any or all Members, and employees on account of services previously
rendered to the limited liability company, whether or not an agreement
to pay such compensation was made before such services were
rendered;
(1)
the purchase of insurance the life of any of its Members, or
employees for the benefit of the Company;
(m)
the participation in partnership agreements, joint ventures,
or other associations of any kind with any person or persons; and
(n)

the indemnification of Members or any other Person.

7.4
Actions of the Managers - The Managers have the power to bind the
Company as provided in this Article VII. No person dealing with the Company
shall have any obligation to inquire into the power or authority of the Managers
acting on behalf of the Company. Whenever a matter is required or allowed to
be approved by the Managers under the Act or the Operating Agreement, such
matter shall be considered approved or consented to upon the receipt of the
affirmative approval or consent, of Managers having Sharing Ratios in excess of
one half of the Sharing Ratios of all Managers.
7.5
Compensation of Managers - The Managers shall be reimbursed for all
reasonable expenses incurred in managing the Company and shall be entitled to
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compensation, in an amount to be determined from time to time by the
affirmative vote of a Majority of the Members.
7.6
Managers' Standard of Care - The Managers' duty of care in the
discharge of the Managers' duties to the Company and the other Members is
limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct,
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law. In discharging their
duties, the Managers shall be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the
records required to be maintained under Article IV and upon such information,
opinions, reports or statements by any of its other Members, or agents, or by
any other person, as to matters the Managers reasonably believes are within
such other person's professional or expert competence and who has been
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the Company, including
information, opinions, reports or statements as to the value and amount of the
assets, liabilities, profits or losses of the Company or any other facts pertinent
to the existence and amount of assets from which distributions to members
might properly be paid.
7.7
Removal of Managers - A Manager may be removed by the affirmative
vote of a Majority of the Members.

ARTICLE VHI
CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
8.1
Initial Contributions - Each Initial Member has made the Capital
Contributions described for that Member on Exhibit A. The value of the
Capital Contributions shall be as set forth on Exhibit A. No interest shall
accrue on any Capital Contribution and no Member shall have the right to
withdraw or be repaid any Capital Contribution except as provided in this
Operating Agreement. Each Additional Member shall make the Initial Capital
Contribution described in the Admission Agreement. The value of the
Additional Member's Initial Capital Contribution and the time for making such
contribution shall be set forth in the Admission Agreement.
8.2
Additional Contributions - In addition to the initial Capital
Contributions, the Managers, with the approval of a Majority of the Members,
may determine from time to time that additional contributions are needed to
enable the Company to conduct its business. Upon making such a
determination, the Managers shall give Notice to all Members in writing at least
14
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thirty (30) business days prior to the date on which such contribution is due.
Such Notice shall set forth the amount of additional contribution needed, the
purpose for which the contribution is needed, and the date by which the
Members should contribute. Any additional contributions not paid when due
shall bear interest at the Default Interest Rate. The Company shall have the right
to offset any delinquent contributions from distributions of Company earnings
or profits of a Member.
8.3
Maintenance of Capital Accounts - The Company shall establish and
maintain Capital Accounts for each Member and Assignee. Each Member's
Capital Account shall be increased by (a) the amount of any Money actually
contributed by the Member to the capital of the Company, (b) the fair market
value of any Property contributed, as determined by the Company and the
contributing Member at arm's length at the time of contribution (net of
liabilities assumed by the Company or subject to which the company takes such
Property, within the meaning of §752 of the Code), and (c) the Member's share
of Net Profits and of any separately allocated items of income or gain except
adjustments of the Code (including any gain and income from unrealized income
with respect to accounts receivable allocated to the Member to reflect the
difference between the book value and tax basis of assets contributed by the
Member). Each Member's Capital Account shall be decreased by (i) the
amount of any Money distributed to the Member by the Company, (ii) the fair
market value of any Property distributed to the Member (net of liabilities of die
Company assumed by the Member or subject to which the Member takes such
Property within the meaning of §752 of the Code), and (iii) the Member's share
of Net Losses and of any separately allocated items of deduction or loss
(including any loss or deduction allocated to the Member to reflect the
difference between the book value and tax basis of assets contributed by the
Member).
8.4
Distribution of Assets - If the Company at any time distributes any of
its assets in-kind to any Member, the Capital Account of each Member shall be
adjusted to account for that Member's allocable share (as determined under
Article IX below) of the Net Profits or Net Losses that would have been
realized by the Company had it sold the assets that were distributed at their
respective fair market values immediately prior to their distribution.
8.5
Sale or Exchange of Interest - In the event of a sale or exchange of
some or all of a Member's Interest in the Company, the Capital Account of the
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Transferring Member shall become the capital account of the assignee, to the
extent it relates to the portion of the Interest Transferred.
8.6
Compliance with Section 704(b) of the Code - The provisions of this
Article VIII as they relate to the maintenance of Capital Accounts are intended,
and shall be construed, and, if necessary, modified to cause the allocations of
profits, losses, income, gain and credit pursuant to Article IX to have
substantial economic effect under the Regulations promulgated under §704(b) of
the Code, in light of the distributions made pursuant to Articles IX and XIV and
the Capital Contributions made pursuant to this Article VIII. Notwithstanding
anything herein to the contrary, this Operating Agreement shall not be construed
as creating a deficit restoration obligation or otherwise personally obligate any
Member to make a Capital Contribution in excess of the Initial Capital
Contribution.

ARTICLE IX
ALLOCATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
9.1
Allocations of Net Profits and Net Losses from Operations - Except
as may be required by §704(c) of the Code, and Section 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4, net
profits, net losses, and other items of income, gain, loss, deduction and credit
shall be apportioned among the Members in proportion to their Sharing Ratios.
9.2
Company Minimum Gain Chargeback - If there is a net decrease in
Company Minimum Gain for a Taxable Year, each Member must be allocated
items of income and gain for that Taxable Year equal to that Member's share of
the net decrease in Company Minimum Gain. A Member's share of the net
decrease in Company Minimum Gain is the amount of the total net decrease
multiplied by the Member's percentage share of the Company Minimum Gain at
the end of the immediately preceding Taxable Year. A Member's share of any
decrease in Company Minimum Gain resulting from a revaluation of Company
Property equals the increase in the Member's Capital Account attributable to the
revaluation to the extent the reduction in minimum gain is caused by the
revaluation. A Member is not subject to the Company Minimum Gain
Chargeback Requirement to the extent the Member's share of the net decrease in
Company Minimum Gain is caused by a guarantee, refinancing, or other change
in the debt instrument causing it to become partially or wholly a Recourse
Liability or a Member Nonrecourse Liability, and the Member bears the
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economic risk of loss (within the meaning of §1.752-2 of the regulations) for
the newly guaranteed, refinanced, or otherwise changed liability.
9.3
Member Minimum Gain Chargeback - If during a Taxable Year there
is a net decrease in member Minimum Gain, any Member with a share of that
Member Minimum Gain (as determined under §L704~2(i)(5) of the
Regulations) as of the beginning of that Taxable Year must be allocated items of
income and gain for that Taxable Year (and, if necessary, for succeeding
Taxable Years) equal to that Member's share of the net decrease in the
Company Minimum Gain. A Member's share of the net decrease in Member
Minimum Gain is determined in a manner consistent with the provisions of
paragraph 9.2. A Member is not subject to this Member Minimum Gain
Chargeback, however, to the extent the net decrease in member Minimum Gain
arises because the liability ceases to be Member Nonrecourse Liability due to a
conversion, refinancing, or other change in the debt instrument that causes it to
become partially or wholly a Company Nonrecourse Liability. The amount that
would otherwise be subject to the Member Minimum Gain Chargeback is added
to the Member's share of Company Minimum Gain. In addition, rules
consistent with those applicable to Company Minimum Gain shall be applied to
determine the shares of Member Minimum Gain and Member Minimum Gain
Chargeback to the extent provided under the Regulations issued pursuant to
§704(b) of the Code.
9.4
Qualified Income Offset - In the event any Member, in such capacity,
unexpectedly receives an Offsettable Decrease, such Member will be allocated
items of income and gain (consisting of a pro rata portion of each item of
partnership income and gain for such year) in an amount and manner sufficient
to offset such Offsettable Decrease as quickly as possible.
9.5
Interim Distributions - From time to time, the Managers shall
determine in their reasonable judgment to what extent, if any, die Company's
cash on hand exceeds the current and anticipated needs, including, without
limitation, needs for operating expenses, debt service, acquisitions, reserves,
and mandatory distributions, if any. To the extent such excess exists, the
Managers may make distributions to the Members in accordance with their
Sharing Ratios. Such distributions shall be in cash or Property (which need not
be distributed proportionately) or partly in both, as determined by the
Managers.
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9.6
Limitations on Distributions - No distribution shall be declared and
paid unless, after the distribution is made, the assets of the Company are in
excess of all liabilities of the Company, except liabilities to Members on
account of their Capital Accounts.

ARTICLE X
TAXES
10.1 Elections - The Managers may make any tax elections for the Company
allowed under the Code or the tax laws of any state or other jurisdiction having
taxing jurisdiction over the Company.
10.2 Taxes of Taxing Jurisdictions - To the extent that the laws of any
Taxing Jurisdiction requires, each Member requested to do so by the Managers
will submit an agreement indicating that the Member will make timely income
tax payments to the Taxing Jurisdiction and that the Member accepts personal
jurisdiction of the Taxing Jurisdiction with regard to the collection of income
taxes attributable to the Member's income, and interest, and penalties assessed
on such income. If the Member fails to provide such agreement, the Company
may withhold and pay over to such Taxing Jurisdiction the amount of tax,
penalty and interest determined under the laws of the Taxing Jurisdiction with
respect to such income. Any such payments with respect to the income of a
Member shall be treated as a distribution for purposes of Article IX. The
Managers may, where permitted by the rules of any Taxing Jurisdiction, file a
composite, combined or aggregate tax return reflecting the income of the
Company and pay the tax, interest and penalties of some or all of the Members
on such income to the Taxing Jurisdiction, in which case the Company shall
inform the Members of the amount of such tax interest and penalties so paid.
10.3 Tax Matters Partner - The Manager with the greatest Sharing Ratio
shall serve as the tax matters partner of the Company pursuant to §6231(a)(7) of
the Code. Any Member designated as tax matters partner shall take such action
as many be necessary to cause each other Member to become a notice partner
within the meaning of §6223 of die Code.
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ARTICLE XI
DISPOSITION OF MEMBERSHIP INTERESTS
I L l First Right - No Member shall sell or transfer any Membership Interest,
or any part thereof, nor enter into any agreement as a result of which any
person or organization may become interested therein unless the transferring
Member complies with the following conditions:
11.1.1
The Membership Interest shall first be offered in writing to
the Company at the price and on the terms of which it is proposed to
be sold, and the Company shall have a period of thirty (30) days to
accept or reject the offer in whole or in part, at the price (prorated,
if the offer is accepted in part) and the terms proposed.
11.1.2
If the offer is rejected in whole or in part by the Company,
the Membership Interest, or remaining part thereof, shall next be
offered in writing to the other Members for a period of twenty (20)
days next following expiration of the thirty (30) day period. The offer
to the other Members shall be prorated in accordance with the ratio of
the interest of each Member to the total interest of all the Members
other than the one making the offer, on the terms and at prices (as to
each offeree) determined by prorating the price. If not all the
remaining interest is disposed of under the apportionment, each
Member desiring to purchase a portion of the remaining interest shall
be entitled to purchase the portion that remains undisposed of as such
Member's Interest in the Company bears to the interest of all other
Members desiring to purchase portions of the remaining interest.
11.1.3
If none or only a portion of the interest of the Member
desiring to sell the same is purchased in accordance with Sections
11.1.1 and 11.1.2, then the partner may sell his interest or the
remainder to a third person or third persons during a three (3) month
period following the expiration of the twenty (20) day period referred
to in Section 11.1.2, but at a price not less than the price offered to the
Company and Members (prorated if only a portion), and on terms no
more favorable than such terms. After the expiration of such three (3)
month period, the interest or portion of the remaining interest shall not
be sold without first being offered to the Company and the remaining
Members in accordance with this Article.
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11.1.4
Any sale or transfer or purported sale or transfer of any
Membership Interest shall be null and void unless made strictly in
accordance with the provisions of this Article The transferee of any
Member's interest shall be required to execute a counterpart of this
Operating Agreement.
lJ^PSl Nothing in this Article, however, shall prevent the
Membership Interest of any Member from being transferred or disposed
of by Will or intestacy for the benefit of the deceased Member's
immediate family or transferred during a Member's lifetime, by sale,
gift or inter vivos trust, to or for the benefit of the Member's immediate
family, provided however, that in respect to transfers by way of
testamentary or inter vivos trust, the trustee or trustees is or are to be a
member or member of the Members' immediate family.
1L2

Limitations - No Membership Interest shall be Disposed of:
(a)
if such disposition, alone or when combined with other
transactions, would result in a termination of the Company within the
meaning of §708 of the Code;
(b)
without an opinion of counsel satisfactory to the Managing
Member that such assignment is subject to an effective registration
under, or exempt from the registration requirements of, the applicable
state and federal securities laws; and
(c)
unless and until the Company receives from the Assignee the
information and agreements that the Managers may reasonably require,
including but not limited to any taxpayer identification number and any
agreement that may be required by any Taxing Jurisdiction.

11.3 Compulsory Sale Upon Expulsion. Recognizing that a professional
service company requires a harmonious and satisfactory personal relationship
between the Members, the Members agree that the following grounds shall each
constitute a sufficient reason for the holders of a 75 % majority interest in the
Company to vote a mandatory purchase of a Member's Membership Interest in
the Company.
11.3.1

If any Member:
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(a) Loses his license to practice engineering in Utah;
(b) Engages in personal misconduct or a breach of this
Agreement that makes his continued presence as a Member in
the Company personally or professionally obnoxious or
detrimental to the other Members of the Company;
(c) Is convicted of a felony, or a crime involving a breach of
ethics, moral turpitude, or immoral conduct; or
(d) Becomes insolvent, makes an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, or is declared a bankrupt.
1i.3.2
No Member shall be expelled without at least 30 days prior
written notice, which shall state the reason for expulsion and shall be signed by
Members holding a 75 % majority interest in the Company.
11.3.3
Upon the expulsion of a Member, the expelled Member shall
be entitled to an amount equal to the book value of the Company multiplied by
the expelled Member's percentage interest in the Company, less any amounts
owing by the expelled Member to the Company.
11.4 Dispositions not in Compliance with this Article Void. Any attempted
Disposition of a Membership Interest, or any part thereof, not in compliance
with this Operating Agreement is null and void ab initio.

ARTICLE XH
DISSOCIATION OF A MEMBER
Dissociation - A Person shall cease to be a Member upon the happening
of any of the following events:
(a)
the Withdrawal of a Member with the consent of a Majority
of the remaining Members prior;
(b)

the bankruptcy of a Member;

(c)

the expulsion of a Member;
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(d)
in the case of a Member who is a natural person, the death
of the Member or the entry of an order by a court of competent
jurisdiction adjudicating the Member incompetent to manage the
Member's personal estate;
(e)
in the case of a Member who is acting as a Member by
virtue of being a trustee of a trust, the termination of the trust (but not
merely the substitution of a new trustee);
(0
in the case of a Member that is a separate Organization other
than a corporation, the dissolution and commencement of winding up
of the separate Organization;
(g)
in the case of a Member that is a corporation, the filing of a
certificate of dissolution, or its equivalent, for the corporation or
the revocation of its charter; or
(h)
in the case of an estate, the distribution by the fiduciary of
the estate's entire interest in the limited liability company.
£SQ Rights of Dissociating Member - In the event any Member dissociates
prior to the expiration of the Term:
(a)
if the dissociation causes a dissolution and winding up of
the Company under Article XIV, the Member shall be entitled to
participate in the winding up of the Company to the same extent as
any other Member except that any Distributions to which the Member
would have been entitled shall be reduced by the damages sustained
by the Company as a result of the Dissolution and winding up;
(b)
if the dissociation does not cause a dissolution and winding
up of the Company under Article XIV, the Member shall be entitled to
an amount equal to die book value of the Member's Membership Interest
in the Company, to be paid within six months of the date of dissociation.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the dissociation is other than as
a result of the death or incompetence of the Member, the Managing
Members may pay the book value of the Member's Membership Interest
in the Company out over a period not to exceed three years, provided
that the dissociating Member shall be entitled to participate as an
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Assignee in the Company until the value of such interest (plus interest at
the Default Interest Rate) is paid in full.

ARTICLE XIII
ADMISSION OF ASSIGNEES AND ADDITIONAL MEMBERS
13.1 Rights of Assignees - The Assignee of a Membership Interest has no
right to participate in the management of the business and affairs of the
Company or to become a Member. The Assignee is only entitled to receive the
Distributions and return of capital, and to be allocated the Net Profits and Net
Losses attributable the Membership Interest.
13.2 Admission of Substitute Members - An Assignee of a Membership
Interest shall be admitted as a Substitute Member and admitted to all the rights
of the Member who initially assigned the Membership Interest only with the
approval of the Managers and a Majority of the Members. The Managers may
grant or withhold the approval of such admission for any in their sole and
absolute discretion. If so admitted, the Substitute Member has all the rights and
powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of the Member
originally assigning the Membership Interest. The admission of a Substitute
Member, without more, shall not release the Member originally assigning the
Membership Interest from any liability to Company that may existed prior to the
approval.
13.3 Admission of Permitted Transferees - Notwithstanding Section 13.2,
hereof, the Membership Interest of any Member shall be transferable without
the consent of the Managers or any of the Members if (i) the transfer occurs by
reason of or incident to the death, dissolution, divorce, liquidation, merger or
termination of the transferor Member, and (ii) the Transferee is a Permitted
Transferee.
13.4 Admission of Additional Members - The Managers may permit the
admission of Additional Members and determine the Capital Contributions of
such Members. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Additional Members may
not become Members unless and until selected to such position as provided
herein, and until they have executed an Admission Agreement in a form
satisfactory to the Managers.
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ARTICLE XIV
DISSOLUTION AND WINDING UP
14.1 Dissolution - The Company shall be dissolved and its affairs wound up,
upon the first to occur of the following events (which, unless the Members
agree to continue the business, shall constitute Dissolution Events):
(a)
the expiration of the Term, unless the business of the
Company is continued with the consent of a Majority of the Members;
(b)

die unanimous written consent of all of the Members; or

(c)
the Dissociation of the Managers, unless the business of the
Company is conlinued with the consent of a Majority of the Members
within 90 days after such Dissociation.
14.2 Effect of Dissolution - Upon dissolution, the Company shall cease
carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the Company business, but
the Company is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of the affairs
of the Company is completed.
14.3 Distribution of Assets on Dissolution - Upon the winding up of the
Company, the Company Property shall be distributed:
(a)
to creditors, including Members who are creditors, to the
extent permitted by law, in satisfaction of Company Liabilities;
(b)
to Members in accordance with positive Capital Account
balances taking into account all Capital Account adjustments for the
Company's taxable year in which the liquidation occurs. Liquidation
proceeds shall be paid within 60 days of the end of the Company's
taxable year or, if later, within 90 days after the date of liquidation.
Such distributions shall be in cash or Property (which need not be
distributed proportionately) or partly in both, as determined by the
Managers.
14.4 Winding Up and Certificate of Dissolution - The winding up of a
limited liability company shall be completed when all debts, liabilities, and
obligations of the limited liability company have been paid and discharged or
reasonably adequate provision therefor has been made, and all of the remaining
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property and assets of the limited liability company have been distributed to the
members. Upon the completion of winding up of the Company, a certificate of
dissolution shall be delivered to the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code for filing. The certificate of dissolution shall set forth the information
required by the Act.

ARTICLE XV
AMENDMENT
15.1 Operating Agreement May Be Modified - The Operating Agreement
may be modified as provided in this Article XV (as the same may, from time to
time be amended). No Member or Manager shall have any vested rights in the
Operating Agreement.
15.2 Amendment or Modification of Operating Agreement - The
Operating Agreement may be amended or modified from time to time only by a
written instrument adopted by the Managers and executed by a Majority of the
Members.

ARTICLE XVI
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
16.1 Entire Agreement - The Operating Agreement together with the Articles
of Organization represents the entire agreement among all the Members and
between the Members and the Company.
16.2 No Partnership intended for Nontax Purposes - The Members have
formed the Company under the Act, and expressly do not intend hereby to form
a partnership under either the Utah Uniform Partnership Act nor the Utah
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. The Members do not intend to be partners
one to another, or panners as to any third party. To the extent any Member, by
word or action, represents to another person that any other Member is a partner
or that the Company is a partnership, the Member making such wrongful
representation shall be liable to any other Member who incurs personal liability
by reason of such wrongful representation.
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16.3 Rights of Creditors and Third Parties under Operating Agreement The Operating Agreement is entered into among the Company and the Members
for the exclusive benefit of the Company, its Members, and their successors and
assignees. The Operating Agreement is expressly not intended for the benefit of
any creditor of the Company or any other Person. Except and only to the extent
provided by applicable statute, no such creditor or third party shall have any
rights under the Operating Agreement or any agreement between the Company
and any Member with respect to any Capital Contribution or otherwise.
16.4 Counterparts - This Operating Agreement may be executed in any
number of counterparts, each of which when executed and delivered shall be
deemed to be an original, and all of which together shall constitute one and the
same instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have executed this Operating Agreement as of the date
set forth beside our names.

Date

/Z-^^k
Scott F. McNeil

Date i>Z.~'$C>-<\(*

&l**dt

Dale K. Bennett

Date

ifZ.-'SO-IC
D. Bradford Peterson

Date

/J>-3J'?<>

Date

/•£--30-^(0

9^y^0^-

ME

EXHIBIT "A"

MEMBER

INITIAL CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTION

PERCENTAGE
INTEREST

Scott F. McNeil

$600.00

60.0%

Dale K. Bennett

250.00

25.0%

D. Bradford Peterson

50.00

•5.0%

Kenneth A. Petty

40.00

4.0%

Stephen J. Fackrell

30.00

3.0%

D. Gregg Meyers

15.00

1.5%

Michael D. Hoffman

15.00

1.5%

$1,000.00

100.0%

Total

ADDENDUM 2

AMENDMENT NO, 2
TO
OPERATING AGREEMENT
OF
McNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, LC
THIS AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO OPERATING AGREEMENT is made and entered
into as of f^JjoxJ ^ > 2001, by and between the parties who have signed this Amendment
No. 2 (this "Amendment").
RECITALS
A.
Scott F. McNeil, Dale K. Bennett, D. Bradford Petersen, Kenneth A. Petty, D.
Gregg Meyers and Michael D. Hoffman entered into an Operating Agreement with an
effective date of January I, 1997, and amended August 1, 2000, by that certain Amendment
No. 1 to Operating Agreement (the "Operating Agreement"), for McNEIL ENGINEERING
AND LAND SURVEYING, LC (the "Company").
B.
The parties hereto desire to amend the Operating Agreement to reflect the
transfer of certain interests in the Company, and various other changes in the Operating
Agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto hereby amend the Operating Agreement as
follows:
1.

The Members of the Company and their percentage interests as of the date of this
Amendment are as follows:
MEMBER

ADDRESS

Scott F. McNeil

6895 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah 84047

57.41%

Dale K. Bennett

6895 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah 84047

26.30%

D. Bradford Petersen

6895 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah 84047

6.68%

Kenneth A. Petty

6895 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah 84047

5.64%

Michael D. Hoffman

6895 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah 84047

2.61%

PERCENTAGE
INTEREST

M
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D. Gregg Meyers

6895 South 900 East
Midvale, Utah 84047

2.

Article I is hereby amended by deleting Sections 1.21 and 1.38.

3.

Article XI is hereby amended by deleting Section 11.1.5 in its entirety.

4.

Article XI is further amended by the addition of the following section:

1.57 %

1L3.4
The term "book value" as used in this Article XI and in
the following Article XII, shall mean the book value as determined by the Company's
accountant who customarily prepares the Company's financial statements, with the
standard adjustments and accruals as are normally reflected in the monthly financial
statements, including but not limited to, the accrual of obligations of the Company to
McNeil Engineering, Inc.
5.

Section 12.1 is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows:
12.1 Dissociation - A Person shall cease to be a Member upon the happening
of any of the following events:
(a)

the withdrawal of a Member;

(b)

the bankruptcy of a Member;

(c)

the expulsion of a Member;

(d)

the death of the Member; or

(e)
the disability of the Member, which shall be deemed to be a
physical or mental condition of the Member which, in the opinion of a licensed
physician selected by the remaining Members, renders the affected Member unable to
perform the material duties and functions of his or her job with the Company.
6.

Section 12.2 is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows:
12.2 Rights of Dissociating Member - In the event any Member dissociates
prior to the expiration of the Term:
(a)
If the dissociation is as a result of the death of a Member, the
Company shall redeem the Member's Membership Interest in an amount equal to the
agreed upon value of the Member's Membership Interest in Company, as determined
-2ME 000068

annually by-the Company's regular accountant who customarily prepares th
Company#s financial statements. The proceeds of any life insurance payable i, ..*•.
Company as a result of the death of a Member shall not be taken into account u:
determining the agreed upon value,, The purchase price to be paid under this Section
12.2(a) shall be paid within 120 days of the date of death of the deceased Member,
provided that the Company shall promptly and diligently proceed to collect the
proceeds of any insurance policy held by the company upon the deceased Member's
life, and shall immediately pay such proceeds (or such portion thereof as equals the
., purchase price for the shares being purchased) to the deceased Member's estate.
(b)
In the event a Member dissociates prior to the expiration of the
Term for any event other than the Member's death < >r wiihdrawa,!, the Member shall be
entitled to an amount equal to the book value of the Member's Membership Interest in
the Company (as defined in Section 11.3 4 above), to be paid over a period, not to
exceed five years.
i

Ait.i h Ml i,i beieby luither amended by the addition of the following Section 1.2.3
11,3 Option to Purchase in event of Withdrawal In the event a Member
withdraws from the Company prior to the expiration of the Term, the Company and
each other Member shall have an option to purchase the withdrawing Member's
Membership Interest. The Company shall have the first option to purchase all, none, oi a
portion of the withdrawing Member's Membership Interest, provided that the Company
may purchase less than all of such interest only if the other Members agree to purchase the
remainder of the interest. The non-withdrawing Members shall have the right to purchase
any interest not purchased by the Company in the ratio that their ownership percentage
bears to the ownership percentages of all Members electing to purchase the remaining
interest. The terms and conditions of the option shall be as set forth below in this
Section.
(a)
For purposes of this Section, a Member shall be deemed to
withdraw when the Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the Member's
employment with the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy, death, disability u
incompetency.
Tj le option to purchase a withdrawing Member's Membership
(5)
Interest shall be exercised by giving written notice thereof to the withdrawing Member
(L.
The purchase price shall be an amount equaj to \he boo*
the Member's Membership Interest in the Company (as d*-fin •.••' i ''<> M*»I •
above), to be paid over a period not to exceed five years.

i-ue of

(d)
The closing of such purchase and sale shall lake place at the
principal office of t k Company at a date designated by the Company., which date shall.
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not be later than 90 days after the date upon which the option herein referred to is
exercised.
8.

Section 13.3 is hereby deleted in its entirety.

9.

Section 14.1 is hereby amended by the deletion of paragraph (c).

The Operating Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and shall remain
unaltered, except to the extent specifically amended herein.
The parties hereto acknowledge and consent to the transfer of certain membership
interests. The parties hereto do hereby waive (a) any rights of first refusal, options or other
rights they may have with respect to the interests being transferred, and (b) any notice to
which they may otherwise be entitled with respect to said transfers.
This Amendment may be signed in several counterparts, through the use of multiple
signature pages appended to each original, and all such counterparts shall constitute one and
the same instrument. Any counterpart to which is attached the signatures of all parties shall
constitute an original of this Amendment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Amendment as of the
date first above written.

Scott F. McNeil

x

v

A

Dale K. Bennett

D. Bradford Petersen

Kenneth A. Petty

Ny
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%UL

\r*s

Michael D Hofffian
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Dak K Bennett
13687 S.Haekamore Circle
Draper. Uluh 8 U)20

AU;MI.:

•

-fJOS

McNeil Engineerim;, Iiic.
6895 S. 000 T
Mi : - ' ! -

1(1'

f

!:

Mh S4047

iMioi' of Resignation - McNeil Engineering, Inc.

i'luuik )Oi- j iwviding mc with the * -ppoim'-iH a- AI.-IK >A ,m v(,«[ f. ; . • liidiiy
years. Because of the circumstances thai 1 ::\c *• un<-d ^-.v- the last lew v rck% ':
believe that it is in my best interest to leave the company and pursue other option- !
therefore resign as an employee of McNeil Engineering, Inc. My intentions of
pint hasing your shares along with the 5 other employees were all in good faith. 1
w v/\7Q for any misunderstandings about the purchasing of (he compai:\
; .-ever
i<:d U to be a hostile takeover as you mentioned. I believe I have been honest
•i >umg the best interests of McNeil Engineering during the course of my career.
1 disagree with yo\n belittling comment that led me to believe that I don't have anv
other options and that 1 must stay bete \-itr the company regardless. In a u^vni
meeting we had with the other members, it was implied that I am not puliuu m\
weight and making the company enough money. I disagree with this comment and
believe \ \w\\^ been a key role in the success of McNeil Engineering and Land
Surveying, I X ever since it has been organized.. I have put in an enornioiis amount
of time and energy above and beyond my call of duty and away from my family in
helping the success of McNeil Engineering. I feel that I need to change my
priorities and put my family in front of my career. Please consider this my two
weeks notice. I will plan on working 40 hours per week for the next two weeks, If
you would like my services longer than two weeks, I would be willing to work out
consulting arrangements.
As for h i p a,c I m not interested ir. .c-ii;.:: anv »•! m ; mk-iehts m -.
» = MI\ i have too much time and effort invested in it and establishing lib: lorn.
i;i; -..iuj' with the employees. If you would like to sell vour portion pb-a •-Ic me
kiu.v , otherwise. ! pli'i <m leaving it set up w if -M \v\\
: nor r r ly agreemeu- - n . -

. - .-.. < 'irwash

. -«ive alsi- ru«.losc<; *•*•: dii.s letie;. die buoks loi iingi ad. a disbutscme it
check tor $4T500 and a check fui $36,000 to covci the vehicle I ih* -tight I had i
sold before I left for Manila for $35,000. d he potential buyei wanh-d t•, KM"- , e \\.\
amount to $32,000 and so I went ahead and purchased it myself for $33odK< y,...
mentioned to me in an e-mail tllat I would lose $10,000 the first year. 1 mentioned to
yeni that the Mitsubishi Diamante cost me over $4,500 per venr h-, »:M I .n- * -^u ;
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for around $7400 (private party value) and that I could sell my 2004 BMW and lose
less than $4t500 the first year. Well I guess I was wrong but close. I used $3,000 of
the $7,400 for the deposit on the car and another approx. $2,600 for taxes and
licensing. The tint was approx. $190, spoiler approx. $475, and the chrome wheels
approx. $2,600 ([ paid this and never expected the company to pay for this). The
company paid approx. $35k plus $7.4k (less $2,500 I am giving you back) or $39.9k
total. I am giving you $36k ($33.5k plus $2.5k for ($7.4k-$3k-$2.6k = $1.8k but I
added an additional $700 in good faith).
Please remember the following:
1.

I haven't taken a raise in over 6 years.

2.

I saved the company at least $24,000 over the past 4 years not taking
out medical insurance.

3.

I have put in an incredible amount of additional hours away from my
family in building the reputation and profitability of McNeil
Engineering and Land Surveying, L.C.

I have contributed to your ability to make in excess of $500,000 per year in
personal income over a number of years. Due to the fact that I have contributed so
much in building up the company over the years, I feel it fair that I receive at least
current book value for my 252 interests (at least $695/interest) in a timely manner.
I believe it is in both of our best interests to be as professional as possible
during this transition for the sake of our families and current employees of McNeil
Engineering, Inc. Should you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to
contact my attorney, Reed Martineau at 322-9222 who is very familiar with the
situation at hand.

Respectfully yours,

Dale K. Bennett
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REED L. MARTINEAU (210 6)
KEITH A. CALL (670 8)
DEREK J. WILLIAMS (98 64)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh F] oor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Telephone:
(8 01) 52 1-9000
Telecopier: (801) 363-0400
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SAI/1 LAKE COUNTY,

McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC.,
MCNEIL ENGINEERING AND LAND
SURVEYING, L.L.C., ENGCAD,
L.L.C., and SCOTT McNEIL,

DISTRICT

COURT

STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR
PARTIAI SUMMARY JUDGMENT

E '1 a:i i ltd f f s ,
vs .
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND LAND
SURVEYING, L.L.C., BENCHMARK
CAD SERVICES, L.L.C., LAND
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC.,
DALE K. BENNETT, AND FLORENCE
ALHAMBRA, i nd ivi dua11y,

Case No. 050917315
.,] i i d g e A n i I B o y d e n

Defendants.

P l a i n t i f f s ' Motion for Partial Summary J u d g m e n t and
Defendant 5-' C r o n n - M o t i o n tor Pa i I- id I Suinni.n y Jinlqui^nt cann-' before
the Coui t for hearing o n Friday, November : 1 7, 2 006.

Plai ntiffs

were r e p r e s e n t e d b y their counsel of record, Mai .t .1 lew C

Barneck

and Martha Knudson of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson, and
Defendants were represented by their counsel of record, Reed L.
Martineau and Derek J. Williams of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings associated with
each of these motions, and having heard argument from both
counsel, for good cause showing, denies Plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and grants Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

This order is based on the reasons

stated by the Court at the hearing, including the following:
1.

Section 12.3 of the McNeil Engineering and Land

Surveying ("ME&LS") Operating Agreement ("Operating Agreement")
provides that a member "shall be deemed to withdraw when the
Member voluntarily resigns or terminates the Member's employment
with the Company for reasons other than bankruptcy, death,
disability or incompetency."
2.

Section 1.10 of the Operating Agreement defines

"Company" as McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying."

On August

17, 2005, Defendant Dale Bennett voluntarily resigned his
employment with McNeil Engineering, Inc. ("MEI").

The Court

concludes that the term "employment" as it is used in Section
12.3 of the. Operating Agreement is not ambiguous, and that the
natural use and meaning of that term as it is used within Section

2

12,3 is that in order to withdraw as a member, the member must
voluntary 1 y r ^ inr * !<u i - -^> - >•*
3

.

^ • - m Mh&LS .

n: * .,..', . . ., IM.ICS ^hat the parties intended the

term "employment" t<; refer only to employment specifical] y with
ME&.1 iS

. . \ *-

.

enough r<

n; - :i : • ii'..-: rerm to be broad

uc!udo employees leased from other businesses

years aft r ] '"inn ..

'

-\

Five

< < -,;. • ng A g i eemei it, 1:1 ie par t::i es

made significant atLionuuienLs to Section 1 2,3 of the Operating
,uid did ?-if make

Agreement

m v ^ h a m e s to tl ie defi n:i tioi is or

c;,Ir . •-u: :;_;.!• j>.- w n i-. .. ;;JUJ a m a n i f e s t a n i n t e n t i o n t o b r o a d e n t h e
scope of Section 12.3 lu include anything other than traditional
emp] oyees
1.

Because Dale Bennett did not; voluntarily resign

emph --per1 with ME&LS, tl ie Coi irt declares tt lat 1 ie i s curi ei itly,
a^zx .jj.iicc it~s inception, has been a member of ME&LS.
resit1'tf Dale BenneM
''tje

,

,

is entitled t:o all of the rights, of a
^r examp.i e the same right to current

information, accounting, disbursement ;:.
any other member of ME&I iS i s entit]5.
submit

i

As a

u:d other benefits that
eeeive.

•i^^e.j on the foregoing, the P] ai ntiffs are ordered to
o ' i o , .msel f o r m i

B( rrn let!: ai u I 1

days of November 1 7, 2 006,

1 .1 ic Cc ;>i n t , w

: -. • 0

a full and complete accounting of all

3

of the rights, disbursements, and other benefits given to members
of ME&LS since August 17, 2005, including an accounting of all
rights, disbursements, and other benefits that have or have not
been given to Dale Bennett.

The Plaintiffs are also ordered to

immediately produce to Mr. Bennett all of the documents
supporting and related to the accounting or which form the basis
for making the accounting.
DATED this ^l^h

day of December, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

The Honorab
Distr
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SERVICE

I state that J am employed in the law offices of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for defendants herein; that I
served the attached ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS' Cl^S/ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
Case No. 050917315, Third Judicial District Court, S,i 11 Lake
County, State of Utah, upon the following parties by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope to:
Mi Matthew C. Barneck
Ms. Martha Knudson
Mr. Paul Burghardt
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
5 0 South Main Street, 7th F] oor
Post Office Box 24 65
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
At torneys for PI a i ntif f s
and causing tl le same to be
D
jS

mailed first clasps, postage pre-paid,
hand delivered,
• ' % •

on ttie

f __ d a y o f D e c e m b e r , 2 00 6.
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REED L. MARTINEAU (210 6) .
KEITH A. CALL (6708)
DEREK J. WILLIAMS (98 64)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh rloor
Post Office Box 4 5000
Salt Lake City, Utah o'J.,
Telephone: (801) 5/1-9000
Telecopier: (HC1) it '-04 00
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Third Judicial District

APR 0 3 2008
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By
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NTY,

DISTRICT

COURT

JITATK < >K NT- \ll

McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC., McNEIL
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING,
L,L.C., ENGCAD,LLC, and
SCOTT McNEII • ,

ORDER AND .JUDGMENT
Case No. 050917315

Plaintiffs,
Judge Pat Brian
vs
ENTERED IN RtGIS'i
OF JUDGMENT'S

BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND LAND
SURVEYING, L.L.C., BENCHMARK CAD
SERVICES, L.L.C., LAND DEVELOPMENT
CADD, INC., DALE K. BENNETT and
FLORENCE ELHAMBRA, Individual1y,

DATE

0*\Q°\ -

-

Defendants.

T h i s m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e Court on Defendant Dale B e n n e t t / s
Motion for" Order of
r\ime

before

Lho

.Judgment.

i.'n

:

The rno t "> o n was f uJ 1 y b r i e f ed ai Id
oral

argun—nt

on

March

P l a i n t i f f s were r e p r e s e n t e d by Matthew C. B a r n e c k .

All

18,

2008.

Defendants

o t h e r than Fl o r e n c e E1 hambra were r e p r e s e i i t e d by Reed I ,. Ma r t i i le .. E .1 I,
K c i t 11

< ill

Mi' I I >" i c k

J.

Wi ] 1 1 arris .

Order and Judgment @J

By his motion, Defendant Dale Bennett asked the Court to enter
a judgment certain against Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant McNeil
Engineering

& Land

Surveying, LLC

("ME&LS") in the amount of

$142,174.93, which Bennett claims represents his share of cash
distributions for the years 2005 and 2007.
Bennett's motion is hereby GRANTED.

The Court finds that

there is no just reason for delaying entry of judgment as requested
by Bennett. JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Dale K. Bennett
against McNeil Engineering & Land Surveying, LLC in the amount of
$142,174.93.

This judgment shall bear post-judgment interest at

the rate of 5.42% per year from the date this judgment is entered.
ME&LS is ordered to deliver a certified check payable to Dale
Bennett in the amount of $142,174.93 to the offices of Benchmark
Engineering and Land Surveying by no later than 5:00 p.m. on
April 1, 2008.

DATED this

*Q

day of JLJj /J

ft/^

2008,

Honorable Pat Bti.an
District Cobrt Judge

-2-

.,., .: w.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 state that I am. employed
~;
law offices of Si IOW,
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys ;< J defendants herein; that I
served the attached ORDER AND JUDGMENT, Case No. 050917315, Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, upon the
following parties by placi ng a true and correct copy thereof in an
envelope to:
Mr. Matthew C. Barneck
Mr. Paul Burghardt
Richards, Brandt, Mill er & Nelson
Wells Fargo Building
299 South Main Street, Si ] i t ,c ; ] 5(30
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and causing the same to be
mailed first class, postage pre-paid,
hand delivered,
on the

c>^^day of March, 2008.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OQOQO

McNeil Engineering and Land
Surveying, LLC; McNeil
Engineering, Inc.; and Scott
McNeil,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff, Counterclaim
Defendant, and Appellant,

Case No. 20080319-CA
F I L E D
(May 21, 2009)
2009 UT App 138

v.
Dale K. Bennett; Benchmark
Engineering and Land
Surveying, LLC; et al.,
Defendant, Counterclaim
Plaintiff, and Appellee.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050917315
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:

Matthew C. Barneck and Paul P. Burghardt, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Reed L. Martineau, Keith A. Call, and Derek J.
Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Davis.
DAVIS, Judge:
Appellant McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC (ME&LS)
filed suit against Appellee Dale K. Bennett for various claims,
and Bennett asserted several counterclaims. The parties
eventually filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue
of whether Bennett's employment resignation from McNeil
Engineering, Inc. triggered his withdrawal as a member of ME&LS.
The district court determined that Bennett did not withdraw as a
member of ME&LS and was therefore due his share of disbursements.
ME&LS filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district
court denied. The district court then, on Bennett's motion,
determined there was "no just reason for delaying entry of
judgment as requested by Bennett" for his share of cash
distributions. ME&LS now appeals.
The threshold issue before us is whether we have subject
matter jurisdiction to address the other issues that the parties

raise on appeal, that is, we must first determine whether the
order being appealed from was properly certified for appeal under
rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the
parties assert that this case is properly before us via a rule
54(b) certification, this consensus is not dispositive.
"'Acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction and . . . a lack of jurisdiction can be raised at
any time by either party or by the court.'" Kennecott Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991) (omission
in original) (quoting Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986)).
Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as
follows:
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Utah Supreme Court has further
elaborated on the requirements of certification under rule 54(b):
First, there must be multiple claims for
relief or multiple parties to the action.
Second, the judgment appealed from must have
been entered on an order that would be
appealable but for the fact that other claims
or parties remain in the action. Third, the
trial court, in its discretion, must make a
determination that there is no just reason
for delay of the appeal.
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
proper certification under rule 54(b) does not occur when the
district court simply directs that judgment be entered and makes
the order final. See id. at 768. The district court must
additionally determine "whether there was any just reason for
delaying the appeal. Ef it found none, it would then be free to
enter such a certification, permitting the appeal to proceed."
Id. Neither of these two determinations alone is sufficient for
certification under rule 54(b):

20080319-CA

2

We must emphasize that all of these
requirements must be met. An order that is
"final" as to a claim or a party in a multiclaim or multi-party suit is appealable under
Rule 54(b) only if it is accompanied by a
district court certification that no just
reason exists for delaying the appeal; an
order that does not wholly dispose of a claim
or a party is not "final" under Rule 54(b)
and will not be appealable, even with such a
certification.
Id. (emphasis added), 1
The parties argue that the district court properly certified
this case under rule 54(b) because the court's Order and Judgment
stated, "The Court finds that there is no just reason for
delaying entry of judgment as requested by Bennett." Although
this reflects the district court's determination that the Order
was a final order, it is unclear whether the court meant the
Order was a final order for purposes of 54(b) .2 Moreover, the

district courts have been directed to provide findings
supporting both the determination that a judgment is final under
rule 54(b) and the determination that there is no just reason for
delay of the appeal. See Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137,
139 (Utah 1992) ("In order to facilitate this court's review of
judgments certified as final under rule 54(b), trial courts
should henceforth enter findings supporting the conclusion that
such orders are final."); id. ("[T]his court has yet to see a
single instance where a trial court has advanced a rationale as
to why there was no just reason for delay. Because this
determination by the trial court is subject to judicial review
under an abuse of discretion standard, a brief explanation should
accompany all future certifications so that this court may render
an informed decision on that question.").
2

Under the facts of this case, that determination would be
inappropriate in any event. The approach adopted by the Utah
Supreme Court "requires that before a claim can be considered
separate, the facts underlying it must be different than those
underlying other claims in the action." Kennecott Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1991) . Thus, to
determine whether an issue certified for appeal is separate from
the issues remaining in district court, we "focus [] on the degree
of factual overlap between [the issues]. When this factual
overlap is such that separate claims appear to be based on the
same operative facts or on the same operative facts with minor
variations, they are held not to constitute separate claims for
(continued...)

20080319-CA
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Order lacks an accompanying determination that there is no just
reason for delay in bringing an appeal. This conclusion is
underscored by the following exchange at the hearing on Bennett's
motion to enforce the prior summary judgment ruling:
[ME&LS's counsel]: And I presume that
order is going to make the--state the
language under Rule 54(b) that it's--therefs
an express determination of final judgment.
I think that's what they were asking for.
[Bennett's counsel]: Your Honor, we
simply requested a judgment. We didn't
request that it be certifiable so it could be
appealed on an interlocutory basis.
THE COURT: The Court simply granted the
relief prayed for in the motion, and orders
counsel for [Bennett] to so reflect in the
order.
All right, next matter.
[ME&LS's counsel]: I'm sorry, Your
Honor. I have to ask for some clarification,
because I'm at a loss here. [Their] moving
papers did ask for a final judgment, and the
Court is entering a ruling that is, in fact,
a final judgment. You['re] ordering my
client to make payment by a date certain.
THE COURT: Is counsel not correct?
That was the specific relief that defense
counsel sought, and the specific relief the
Court granted.
[Bennett's counsel]: We sought a
judgment--an order of judgment in that
amount, Your Honor. We did not specifically
request that it be certified as [a] final
order for--as a final judgment for purposes
of appeal. So I don't know what--exactly
2

(...continued)
rule 54(b) purposes." Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, where the majority, if not all, of the
issues in this case are related to Bennett's resignation and the
events surrounding it, and where there remains pending an ME&LS
claim that Bennett breached the operating agreement, there is
factual overlap between the claim before us and claims pending in
the district court.

20080319-CA
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what we1re asking for here. We wanted a
judgment that we could collect upon. Your
Honor, has ruled that the payment is to be
made, and-THE COURT: Cite the specific language
in your motion regarding the relief sought,
and that is the order of the Court--whatever
the specific language of your motion reads.
The district court therefore clearly made no determination as to
whether there was any just reason for delaying an appeal but
simply granted Bennett's motion, which requested only "an order
of judgment for Bennett's share of member distributions."3 Thus,
there was no proper certification under rule 54(b), and we do not
have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in
this appeal.
"When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it
retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac,
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). We
therefore dismiss the appeal.

James Z. Davis, Judge

WE CONCUR:

William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge
3

Bennett's motion was devoid of the "no just reason for
delay" language but instead stated, "There is no reason the Court
cannot enter a judgment against ME&LS for this amount and order
that Plaintiffs pay Bennett this amount." Bennett's supporting
memorandum used language closer to that of rule 54(b), stating,
"Bennett is entitled to this judgment based upon the Court's
prior ruling and there is no just cause for delaying the entry of
this judgment." Neither filing, however, requested the court to
make a determination that there was no just reason for delaying
an appeal.

20080319-CA
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RECEIVED
SEP 2 3 2010
Richards, Brandt
Miller & Nelson

SEP 2 1 ^ow
MTrAK\ECUON^
Deputy <

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC., McNEIL
ENGINEERING AND LAND
SURVEYING, LLC, and, SCOTT
McNEIL, an individual,

'

Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY

vs.
Case No. 050917315
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND
LAND SURVEYING, LLC, BENCHMARK
CAD SERVICES, LAND
DEVEOLOPMENT CADD, INC., DALE K.
BENNETT, an individual, and,
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an
individual,

Judge: L.A. DEVER

Defendants..
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendants' Notice to Submit for
Decision their Motion to Enforce Judgment and Motion for Leave to (1) Serve Third Set
of Interrogatories, (2) File Fourth Request for Production of Documents, and (3) Take
Second 30(b)(6) Deposition, filed July 21, 2010. The Court having reviewed
Defendants' Motions and Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto, and being duly advised in the
premises of each, makes the following ruling.
Defendants' Motion to Enforce Judgment
Defendants request the Court to enforce the April 3, 2008, Order and Judgment

issued by the Honorable Pat Brian. The Order and Judgment entered in favor of
Defendant Dale K. Bennett ("Bennett") in the amount of $142,174.93. On April 21,
2008, the parties stipulated a joint motion to stay the pending trial while Plaintiffs
appealed in part, the Court's Order entered December 21, 2006, which ruled that
Bennett is a member of ME&LS and an Order entered April 2, 2008, which denied
reconsideration of the December 21, 2006, ruling.
Pursuant to the terms of the April 21, 2008, stipulation Bennett agreed that the
stay of any execution of the Order and Judgment may be entered without the need to
post a supersedeas bond. On May 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiffs'
appeal for failure to show certification of the finality of the trial court's order. A remittitur
was entered on August 10, 2009.
Defendants now seek enforcement of the April 3, 2008, Order and Judgment as
the basis for the earlier stipulation no longer apply.
This Court finds the following explanation regarding such matters helpful in its
consideration:
[TJhe "law of the case" doctrine is employed to avoid delay and to
prevent injustice. "The purpose of [this] doctrine is that in the interest of
economy of time and efficiency of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the
delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings
upon the same propositions in the same case." Richardson v. Grand
Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). See Conderv. A. L.
Williams &Assocs.. Inc.. 739 P,2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
"Although a trial court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, prior
relevant rulings made in the same case are generally to be followed."
People ex. rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 666 P.2d 550, 553 (Colo. 1983).
2

The law of the case doctrine is particularly applicable when, in the
case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present the case
in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is introduced.
Sittner v. Bio Horn Tar Sands & Oil, Inc.. 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984);
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d at 397; Hammer v. Gibbons
& Reed Co., 29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Utah 1973).
Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Upon review of the case, the Order and Judgment issued on April 3, 2008, was
intended to serve as the final order on Defendants' counterclaim for declaratory relief.
See e.g. Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245,1J12, 988 P.2d 1 ("In this case, the
October 21 Order was properly certified because it granted summary judgment for all
claims against the Estate. Further, the trial court also made the required finding that
there was 'no just reason for delay/ and expressly ordered the entry of judgment as
required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).")
Similarly, Judge Brian's Court found "that there is no just reason for delaying
entry of judgment as requested by Bennett." The Order and Judgment was entered into
the Registry of Judgments on April 9, 2008.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Order and
Judgment, issued and entered on April 3, 2008, is a final order on Defendants'
counterclaim for declaratory relief.
Defendants7 Motion for Leave
Defendants' seek leave from this Court to continue certain discovery proceedings
because of Plaintiffs' alleged actions which are contrary to the ruling of the Honorable
3

Ann Boyden. Specifically, while Judge Boyden declared in a ruling issued November
17, 2006, that Bennett was entitled to all of the rights of other ME&LS members,
Plaintiffs have allegedly been acting contrary to this ruling by failing to provide Bennett
with information he is claimed to be entitled to including: tax returns, financial
statements, disbursements of any kind to other members, etc.
Defendants fail to present any viable legal argument and analysis to the Court
that would address their claimed entitlement to additional discovery in light of a final
ruling on Bennett's claim for declaratory relief and dismissal of his accounting claim on
January 29, 2008.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendants1 Motion for Leave.
This Ruling serves as the Order of the Court. No further order is required.

Dated 21s1 day of September, 2010.

BY THE COURT:

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling dated
this

'1V^ day of September,2010, postage prepaid, to the following:

Reed L. Martineau
Keith A. Call
Derek J. Williams
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

Matthew C. Barneck
Martha Knudson
Paul P. Burghardt
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
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MATTHEW C. BARNECK [5249]
PAUL P. BURGHARDT [10795]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
E-Mail: Matthew-Barneck(5),rbmn.com
Paul-Burghardt@rbmn.com
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC; McNEIL
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING, I
LLC; and SCOTT McNEIL, an individual,

AMENDED ORDER CERTIFYING
ORDER AND JUDGMENT AS FINAL

Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants,
vs.
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND
LAND SURVEYING, LLC; BENCHMARK
CAD SERVICES, LLC; LAND
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC; and
DALE K. BENNETT, an individual;
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an individual,
Defendants and Counter Claimants.

Civil No. 050917315
Judge L.A. Dever

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Motion to Alter or Amend Order
filed by Plaintiff McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC ("MEALS") on October 1,2010,
and also the Motion for Certification That The April 3, 2008 Order and Judgment is Final for
Purposes of Rule 54(b) and for Appeal, recentlyfiledby the Defendants. Based on the foregoing, the
Court hereby finds and ORDERS as follows:
1.

An Order and Judgment was entered in this case by the Honorable Pat Brian of

the Third District Court for Salt Lake County on April 3,2008.
2.

ME&LS filed a Notice of Appeal on April 8,2008.

3.

The Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision on May 25,2009

ruling that the Order and Judgment were not final for purposes of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals specified certain language to be used when the District Court
certifies an order as final. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court must make
a determination that the operative facts underlying the claims to be appealed are separate and distinct
from those on which the remaining claims are based.
4.

This Court issued a Minute Entry on September 21, 2010 finding that the

"Order and Judgment, issued and entered on April 3, 2008, is a final order on Defendants'
counterclaim for declaratory relief." The Minute Entry was intended to be the Order of the Court.
5.

This Order modifies the Minute Entry and is intended to certify the Order and

Judgment as final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 54(b),
this Court makes the express direction for entry of afinaljudgment as to one or more but fewer than
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all of the claims or parties in this action. The Court hereby determines that the Order and Judgment
entered April 3,2008 was and is intended to be final under Rule 54(b), The Court also determines
that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal from the Order and Judgment.
6.

This Court also makes the determination that the operative facts underlying

the adjudicated claims are separate and distinct from those underlying the claims which remain in the
District Court. The operative facts relating to Bennett's Counterclaim, in this action on which the
Order and Judgment is based, are summarized as follows:
a.
b.
c.
d.

7.

The language of the ME&LS Operating Agreement and its
amendments.
The history of ME&LS and its relationship with McNeil
Engineering, Inc. ("MEI").
The voluntary nature of Bennett's resignation.
The payments to members and the changes of ownership in
ME&LS after Bennett's resignation.
By contrast, the claims of the Plaintiffs which remain in the District Court are

based upon a distinctly different set of operative facts, which are summarized as follows:
a.

b.

c.

d.

Bennett's subsequent establishment of a competing
engineering firm, and whether his conduct before and after
departure breached duties to ME&LS or the Operating
Agreement of ME&LS.
Bennett's interactions with the Engcad entities set up to
outsource drafting work to the Philippines, and whether his
conduct interfered with ME&LS' business relationship with
Engcad or breached duties to Engcad.
Bennett's subsequent use of ME&LS' design practices, tools,
and procedures, and whether such conduct is a
misappropriation of trade secrets.
Whether the logo and slogan of Bennett's new company
infringe upon the rights of ME&LS and MEL
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8.

Based on the foregoing, ihis Court certifies the Order and Judgment of April 3,

2008 as final for all purposes under Rule 54(b), as described above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this J j d a y of October, 2010.
BY THE COURT: > .

HOWORA¥LE

CcS-v^fr

THIRD DISfraCT COURT-JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MART1NEAU

RYiED L. MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
sent byfirst-classmail, postage prepaid, on this
day of October, 2010, to the following:
Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Defendants

G:\EDSI\OOCSM6709V0002\RZ9023.DOC
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ADDENDUM 9

MATTHEW C. BARNECK [5249]
PAUL P. BURGHARDT [10795]
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Wells Fargo Center, 15th Floor
299 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
E-Mail: Matthew-Barneck(3),rbmn.com
Paul-Burghardt@rbmn.com
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
McNEIL ENGINEERING, INC; McNEIL
ENGINEERING AND LAND SURVEYING,
LLC; and SCOTT McNEIL, an individual,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants,
vs.
BENCHMARK ENGINEERING AND
LAND SURVEYFNG, LLC; BENCHMARK
CAD SERVICES, LLC; LAND
DEVELOPMENT CADD, INC; and
DALE K. BENNETT, an individual;
FLORENCE B. ALHAMBRA, an individual,
Defendants and Counter Claimants.

Civil No. 050917315
Judge L.A. Dever

Counterclaim Defendant McNeil Engineering and Land Surveying, LLC
("ME&LS"), pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby gives
notice that it appeals the Amended Order Certifying Order and Judgment as Final entered in this
matter on October 17, 2010, along with interim orders of the Court which led to that final Order,
including the Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' CrossMotion for Partial Summary Judgment entered December 21,2006, the Order on Plaintiffs' Motion
for Reconsideration Re: Bennett's Membership in ME&LS entered April 2, 2008, the Order and
Judgment entered April 3,2008, the Minute Entry entered January 19,2010, and the Minute Entry
entered September 21,2010,
The Court from which the appeal is taken is the Third District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 050917315, assigned to the Honorable LA, Dever. The
appeal is taken to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102, subject to
possible assignment to the Utah Court of Appeals.
In connection with a previous appeal, ME&LS posted a bond for costs on appeal in
the amount of $300 pursuant to Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That appeal was
dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction and no costs were awarded. The District Court's official docket in
this matter shows that the cost bond remains posted with the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, ME&LS
believes the existing cost bond satisfies the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 6 in connection with
this Notice of Appeal.

DATED this W_ day of October, 2010.
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

MATTHEW C. BARNECK
PAUL P. BURGHARDT
Attorneys for McNeil Engineering
and Land Surveying, LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was
mailed, first class and postage prepaid, on October^ 2010, to the following:
Reed L. Martineau, Esq.
Keith A. Call, Esq.
Derek J. Williams, Esq.
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
PX). Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Defendants
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